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The Uses and Abuses of Presidential Impeachment
Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Huq and David Landau*
Abstract
With the charging and trial of President Trump, impeachment has once again assumed a central role
in United States constitutional law and politics. Yet because so few impeachments, presidential or
otherwise, have occurred in American history, we have little understanding of how removing presidents
in the middle of a term alters the direction of a constitutional democracy. This article illuminates the
appropriate scope and channels of impeachment by examining the law and practice of presidential
removal globally. We first catalog possible modalities of impeachment through case studies from South
Korea, Paraguay, Brazil, and South Africa. We then deploy large-n empirical analysis of
constitutional texts, linked to data about democratic quality, in order to understand the impact of
impeachment on democracy. Contrary to claims tendered in the present political fracas, we show that
impeachment is not well conceived as a tool for removing criminals or similar “bad actors” from the
presidency. Instead, it is commonly and effectively used as a tool to resolve deep political crises.
Moreover, despite much recent concern about the traumatic and destabilizing effects of an impeachment,
we do not find that successful removals have a negative impact on the quality of democracy. Our
comparative analysis has significant implications for the design and practice of impeachment, especially
in the United States. It supports consequentialist grounds for embracing a broader, more political gloss
on the famously cryptic phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors,” in contrast to the narrow, criminal
standard promoted by President Trump and other presidents. Against settled U.S. understandings, it
shows how other institutions, such as courts, can also play a valuable role in increasing the credibility
of factual and legal determinations made during impeachment. And it suggests that impeachment
works best where, in contrast to U.S. design, a successful removal triggers rapid new elections that can
serve as a “hard reboot” for a crisis-ridden political system.

University of Chicago Law School (Ginsburg and Huq); Florida State University School of Law (Landau). For helpful
discussions, thanks to Yoav Dotan, Roberto Dalledone, Juliano Zaiden Benvido, Sabrina Ragone, Jeong-In Yun, and
participants at the ICON-S Conference in Santiago, Chile, July 2019, as well as workshops at Georgetown Law Center,
NYU School of Law, Vanderbilt Law School, and the University of California-Berkeley School of Law. Thanks to
Young Hun Kim for providing useful data.
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The Uses and Abuses of Presidential Impeachment
“Impeach Eisenhower. Impeach Nixon.
Impeach Lyndon Johnson. Impeach Ronald Reagan.”1
Introduction
The President must go! So rings the call across many democracies, including our own. Political
opposition and civil society movements have targeted elected leaders who have become politically
unpopular, ineffective, or allegedly (and perhaps actually) corrupt. Impeachment discussions seethed
in the United States even before President Donald Trump took office.2 They burst dramatically into
the open in September 2019 with the announcement of an inquiry in the House of Representatives,
which (as this writing) had precipitated the third presidential impeachment and Senate trial in U.S.
history. Yet this specter of removal is not distinctive to President Trump. Impeachment talk also
dogged his predecessors.3 Nor should Americans think their discontents unique. In France, the gillet
jaune protest movement has been candid in its “hatred” for President Emmanuel Macron, and its
desire to see him ousted from office.4 And in Venezuela, an opposition leader went so far as to declare
himself ‘interim president’ in a (so far, vain) attempt to accelerate the departure of a well-entrenched
presidential incumbent.5 Regime change has yet to arrive in Caracas, Paris, or Washington, DC. But
presidents have no cause to rest easy. In democracies as diverse as Brazil, South Korea and South
Africa, presidents have been removed in the middle of their term in the past decade.6 Impeachment
talk then is not necessarily idle chatter. At least in some instances, it is a credible position that can
attract sufficient political and popular support to be realized.
The dispatch of a president from office by a mechanism other than through the regular
operation of elections, term limits, and the normal apparatus of political selection goes to the core of
democratic governance. This is a moment of increasing popular discontent with established regimes,
coupled with a growing polarization within the voting publics of many democracies.7 Under those
1

Annie Hall (1977).

See Emily Jane Fox, Democrats are Paving the Way to Impeach Donald Trump, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 15, 2016, at
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/12/democrats-pave-the-way-to-impeach-donald-trump
2

See, e.g., Alexander Bolton, White House Taking Impeachment Seriously, THE HILL (July 25, 2014), at
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/213329-white-house-gop-might-try-to-impeach; CHARLOTTE DENNETT, THE
PEOPLE V BUSH, ONE LAWYER'S CAMPAIGN TO BRING THE PRESIDENT TO JUSTICE AND THE NATIONAL GRASS ROOTS
MOVEMENT SHE ENCOUNTERS ALONG THE WAY (2010).
3

See Arthur Goldhammer, The Yellow Vests Protests and the Tragedy of Emmanuel Macron, FOR. AFF., Dec. 12 2018, at
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/france/2018-12-12/yellow-vest-protests-and-tragedy-emmanuel-macron
4

5

See Alan Taylor, A Venezuelan Opposition Leader Declares Himself ‘Interim President’, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 24, 2019, at
https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2019/01/photos-venezuelan-opposition-leader-declares-himself-interimpresident/581158/.
6

See infra Part I.

On the relation of polarization to democratic crisis, see Jennifer McCoy, Tahmina Rahman, and Murat Somer,
Polarization and the global crisis of democracy: Common patterns, dynamics, and pernicious consequences for democratic politics, 62 AM.
BEHAV. SCI. 16, 16-19 (2018) (showing how popular polarization can lead to “gridlock and careening,” “democratic
erosion or collapse under new elites and dominant groups,” or “democratic erosion or collapse with old elites and
dominant groups”).
7
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conditions, it is perhaps unsurprising that elected tenures would prove to be fragile, and talk of
preemptive removal and impeachment endemic.
Nevertheless, legal scholars and social scientists have till now lagged behind the pace of
popular sentiment. To be sure, there is a wealth of scholarship on the role of impeachment in the U.S.
Constitution.8 That work—much of it excellent--starts from the Framers’ design, and then reasons
from that design to present applications.9 As a result, it explores a relatively narrow compass within
the space of possible constitutional design. It does not help that the “Constitution is surprisingly
opaque as to how apex criminality should be addressed.”10 The U.S. Constitution’s text, for example,
uses the ambiguous term “high crimes and misdemeanors” to define a threshold for presidential
removal. It is no surprise that President Trump would insist that this includes only statutorily defined
crimes.11 The Constitution also fails to specify a standard of proof either for impeachment or
conviction. Again, it is no surprise that both the President’s defenders and his prosecutors each assert
their own favored standards.12 Finally, the text conspicuously fails to specify clearly whether a sitting
president can be indicted prior to the completion of impeachment proceedings.13 The result is a
process of deeply uncertain scope and consequences.14 Arguments about many of these
uncertainties—not just in the context of the Trump impeachment but beyond—of necessity hinge on
predictions about the consequences of presidential ouster.
With many other constitutional questions, our history can provide clarity about consequences.
Not so here. To date, there have been only three successful presidential impeachments; no sitting
president has ever been removed.15 We thus simply have no basis for knowing whether impeachments
tend to shore up democracy, or whether they undermine it.16 The impeachment language in Articles I
See CASS SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE (2017); LAURENCE TRIBE AND JOSHUA MATZ, TO END A
PRESIDENCY: THE POWER OF IMPEACHMENT (2018); FRANK BOWMAN, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: A
HISTORY OF IMPEACHMENT FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP (2019); ALLAN LICHTMAN, THE CASE FOR IMPEACHMENT (2017);
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, THE CASE FOR IMPEACHING TRUMP (2018). Earlier treatments include CHARLES L. BLACK,
IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK (1974), RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1974);
Laurence H. Tribe, Defining High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Basic Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712 (1998).
8

Correlatively, much of the criticism of that work focuses on the “strategic” nature of the analysis. See Michael Stokes
Paulsen, To End A (Republican) Presidency, 132 HARV. L. REV. 689, 690 (2018). For a vigorous response to this criticism,
see Laurence H. Tribe and Joshua Matz, To (Pretend to) Review Our Book, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 79 (2018) (accusing
Paulsen of “repeatedly and egregiously misdescrib[ing] our thesis, reasoning, and conclusions”). The vehemence of this
debate is indicative of how difficult scholarly discussion of impeachment can be.
9

See Aziz Z. Huq, Legal or Political Checks on Apex Criminality: An Essay on Constitutional Design, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1506,
1508 (2018) [hereinafter “Huq, Legal and Political Checks”] (discussing sources of ambiguity).
10

Peter Baker, Trump Team, Opening Defense, Accuses Democrats of Plot to Subvert Election, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2020; see
Nikolas Bowie, High Crimes without Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 59 (Dec. 10, 2018).
11

12

Baker, supra note 11.

For the Justice Department’s view, see U.S. Dep't Just.: Office of Legal Counsel, A Sitting President's Amenability to
Indictment and Criminal Prosecution (2000), available at https://www.justice.gov/file/19351/download.
13

See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos, Republicans Block Subpoenas for New Evidence as Impeachment Trial Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/21/us/politics/senate-impeachment-republicans-democrats.html.
14

See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 88-116 (providing a characteristically incisive account of the Johnson and Clinton
impeachments).
15

16

See Baker, supra note 11.
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and II is largely (if not wholly) general, extending beyond presidents to encompass judges and certain
officials.17 But the history of nonpresidential removals is also of limited use. Presidential impeachments
plainly raise empirical questions, legal problems, and normative concerns beyond those implicated by
the removal of federal judges and other officials. Most obviously, the electoral mandate that presidents,
unlike all other unelected actors, possess raises a distinctive question about the democratic legitimacy
of impeachment-like removal mechanisms, such as criminal prosecution or declarations of incapacity,
that bypass the people.18 There is a distinct and pressing question whether impeachment is consistent
with the principle of popular sovereignty that underwrites democracy—or whether it is at odds with
democracy as a going concern.
One analytic pathway, however, remains uncharted. At the same time as the focus of American
scholars narrows, there remains a serious dearth of legal scholarship leveraging other countries’
experience with presidential removal.19 While some political scientists have documented the relatively
low success rate of calls for removal globally,20 no one has examined systematically the design of
presidential impeachment from a comparative perspective. This is not for want of relevant evidence.
As we shall show, the design of removal procedures for chief executives is almost uniformly a matter
of constitutional text, not statutory policy. This reflects a (perhaps undertheorized) assumption that
the question is an important one to be insulated, to some extent, from transient politics.
Examination of impeachment provisions globally is relevant to a number of questions
fundamental to a democracy.21 A minimum, it seems important to know whether the substantive and
procedural elements of the U.S. system are distinctive, or else outliers as a matter of constitutional
design. Relatedly, a global view of impeachment can illuminate its potential function in a constitutional
democracy, and hence suggest how its scope and mechanisms might be reconciled with electoral
democracy. When should a democratic mandate be superseded because of the perceived costs of
allowing the people’s choice to maintain power? If supersession is to be allowed, should it be through
a political process (defined and judged according to partisan standards), or a more formalized, lawgoverned process (say, defined by the criminal law)? And what mechanisms, institutions, and
procedures should be involved in the removal process? Should they be other elected actors, or else
non-elected, professional institutions? What should be the result of a presidential removal: Should it
be a new election, or should either an ally of the president or someone else take control of the
government?
This Article analyzes the problem of presidential impeachment or removal in comparative
perspective. We present here the first comprehensive analysis of how constitutions globally have
addressed this question, and what the consequences of different design choices are likely to be.
See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS 77-83 (1996) (discussing the scope of the impeachment remedy under the federal constitution).
17

18

See Daniel J. Hemel & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2018).

But see John K M. Ohnesorge, Comparing Impeachment Regimes (March 9, 2019). Univ. of Wisconsin Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 1468. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3356929 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3356929
19

20

See infra notes 155-164.

Some of these questions are also likely to matter to authoritarian constitutions, which are also designed with the aim of
minimizing agency costs. See Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES 1, 6 (Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, eds., 2013).
21
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Because actual removals of chief executives turn out to be rare (although calls to remove are frequent),
we employ a two-fold empirical strategy. We begin by developing five case studies, including the
United States, of removals that occur through a range of procedures and under quite different political
conditions. This granular approach helps pick out some of the variation in constitutional technologies
of presidential removal. It also offers clue as to what legal and political factors matter in practice. Next,
we zoom out to offer a comprehensive, large-n, description and evaluation of the relevant
constitutional design choices. In the final part, we draw carefully nuanced conclusions about the
normative stakes of varying design decisions in this domain.
Before summarizing our descriptive findings and normative suggestions, we should clarify the
universe of cases that we are considering. Removal of a chief executive is a necessary power in any
political system, whether presidential, parliamentary, or otherwise. Even traditional monarchies have
procedures for removing kings who are incapacitated or incompetent (even if they flounder when
dealing with recalcitrant dukes!).22 Our focus, however, is primarily on fixed-term executives, namely
presidents. Such officials are found in an array of political systems, including presidential systems,
semi-presidential systems,23 and even some parliamentary systems.24 We include heads of state in
parliamentary systems, who tend to have a more ceremonial role, but exclude prime ministers (who
are often disciplined instead through a parliamentary ‘vote of confidence’ mechanism25).
We show first that impeachment does not tend to focus on the criminal behavior or bad acts
of an individual president. Rather, it typically serves as a response to a systemic political crisis in a
presidential system. In some recent impeachments, such as in South Korea, crisis combined with
evidence of criminality to oust a president from office. But in other cases, such as in Brazil and
Paraguay, there was scant evidence of criminality: Removal was rather used to push out weak
presidents who had lost the ability to govern. Consistent with this practice, many constitutions around
the world include a textual standard for removal that explicitly goes beyond criminality to include
governance failures or poor performance in office, while others enable such an approach through
ambiguity. Generalizing from textual evidence and case studies, we suggest that impeachment globally
is, in practice, a device to mitigate the risk of paralyzing systemic political crisis, beyond the risk of
individual malfeasance. A second important empirical conclusion follows. Examining measures of
democratic quality in impeachment’s wake, we find no evidence (at least in the small sample of cases
we have) that impeachment of a president reduces the quality of democracy in countries where it is

Indeed, during the Middle Ages the question of monarchical removal become a central problem for English
constitutional theory; between 1327 and 1485, five English monarchs were deposed. See William Huse Dunham and
Charles T. Wood, The Right to Rule in England: Depositions and the Kingdom's Authority, 1327-1485, 81 AM. HIST. REV. 738,
738-9 (1976). Two centuries later, regicide was hedged with numerous defenses. See Mos Tubb, Printing the regicide of
Charles I, 89 HIST. 89.296 (2004): 500-524.
22

23

See Robert Elgie, A fresh look at semipresidentialism: variations on a theme, 16 J. DEM. 98, 105-07 (2005).

For example, the Czech and Slovak states have nonelected presidents coexisting with elected parliaments. See
Matthew S. Shugart, Of presidents and parliaments, 2 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 30, 30 (1993). On the increasing similarity
between presidential and parliamentary systems, see Oren Tamir, Governing by Chief Executives, manuscript; Jose Cheibub,
Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg, Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, BRIT J. POL. SCI. (2013); Richard Albert, The
Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, 51 AM. J. COMP. L 531 (2009); THOMAS POGUNTKE AND PAUL WEBB, THE
PRESIDENTIALIZATION OF POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MODERN DEMOCRACIES (2005).
24

John D. Huber, The vote of confidence in parliamentary democracies, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 269, 272 (1996) (describing vote
of confidence mechanisms in eighteen democracies).
25
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carried out.26 The same holds true when impeachment is endeavored, but not completed. The fear
that a more political impeachment process would necessarily be destabilizing has no empirical support
in the recent historical experience of impeachment. Rather than being a way of undermining or
circumventing democracy, we suggest that in fact impeachment may well be able to play an important
role in its stabilization.
Although we tread carefully in drawing normative conclusions given the limited pool of
available data, our analysis still has important implications for the design and practice of impeachment,
particularly in the United States. We argue that a model of impeachment focused only on the individual
culpability of chief executives – what we call a “bad actor” model – is likely incomplete and undesirable
as a functional matter. Instead, impeachment processes should be attentive to the broader political
context, which we call a “systemic problems” model. Impeachment can be useful to ameliorate one
of the major weaknesses of presidentialism – rigidity27 – by removing poorly performing presidents
during extreme crises of governance.
In the United States, Stephen Griffin has recently tracked the history of impeachment
discourse in the United States to show that partisan dynamics forced it into a Procrustean bed of
“indictable crimes” and nothing more.28 Consistent with Griffin’s thesis, President Trump’s legal team
has argued in the Senate that the House’s articles were deficient in part because impeachment was
only appropriate in the event of a violation of “established law” and, likely, “criminal law.”29 We think,
to the contrary, that the comparative evidence suggests that such a narrow interpretation of the term
“high crimes and misdemeanors” may well be problematic. A broader, more political meaning of this
notoriously cryptic standard may make more functional sense as an element of a well-functioning
democracy.
Aside from shedding new light on the well-studied issue of “high crimes and misdemeanors,”
our analysis also critiques a range of crucial but less-studied features of impeachment in the United
States. Some are a product of judicial or political practice; others would require a constitutional
amendment to fix. All are taken as givens—in quite problematic ways. For example, we highlight the
striking fact that the impeachment standard in the U.S. is uniform across different types of actors,
such as presidents, judges, and cabinet members, rather than varying as in many other countries. We
think a differentiated approach makes more sense, because impeachment of different kinds of actors
serves different purposes. We also highlight the ways in which actors other than legislatures contribute
fact-finding, legitimacy, and other benefits to impeachment processes in some contexts. In particular,
contrary to the settled understanding in the United States and the leading precedent,30 a more robust
role for courts in impeachment processes may not be inconsistent with a political, regime-centered
model of impeachment. In some contexts, courts can lend credibility to factual and legal
26

See infra Table 2.

A point, of course, made in the classic essay by Juan Linz. See Juan J. Linz, The perils of presidentialism. 1 J. DEMOCRACY
51, 56-57 (1990).
27

See Stephen M. Griffin, Presidential Impeachment in Tribal Times: The Historical Logic of Informal Constitutional Change, 51
CONN. L. REV. --(forthcoming 2019) (on file with authors).
28

See Trial Memorandum of President Donald J. Trump 1, Jan. 20, 2020, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/Trial-Memorandum-of-President-Donald-J.-Trump.pdf (arguing that for this reason, “abuse
of power” was not an impeachable offense); cf. Bowie, supra n. 11 (canvassing arguments that crimes are not required.)
29

See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to impeachment procedures of a
federal judge as a “political question” beyond judicial competence).
30
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determinations made during impeachment – a credibility that has been in short supply during recent
processes in the United States. Finally, our analysis highlights that impeachment design in the United
States fails to maximize the value of impeachment by having the vice-president (or similar actor)
automatically succeed to office, rather than calling new elections. We think that calling new elections
after a successful impeachment is a superior option because it increases impeachment’s ability to serve
as a reset for a crisis-laden system.
We recognize that this topic is of great current interest in the United States, largely because of
the impeachment trial of President Trump. Indeed, there is a growing academic and nonacademic
literature on the topic of his impeachment.31 Some of these contributions confront Trump’s particular
doings; others are more abstract treatments not limited to the particulars of his case. We place
ourselves in the latter camp, abstracting away from the current presidency, and avoiding inevitably
partisan implications in the hope of generating more durable insights. At the same time, we also
recognize that the occasion of the Trump impeachment seems to be a particularly good moment to
stimulate careful reflection on an important constitutional issue.
Our analysis is organized as follows. Part I introduces our topic by presenting case studies of
recent instances of impeachment from around the world: South Korea, Brazil, Paraguay, and South
Africa. We also briefly survey American law and experience to benchmark of domestic experience.
Part II draws on large-n empirical evidence to describe and analyze the history, rules, and practice of
presidential removal globally. We find that impeachment is typically a response to governance
problems, and so extend beyond the standard “bad actor” model that dominates much American
discourse. Systems vary in terms of both the predicate acts that can trigger impeachment along with
the process, including both the actors involved and the various rules governing time and consequence.
Finally, Part III draws on this evidence to theorize better impeachment institutions, focusing on
implications for the United States. We conclude by arguing that a more frequent, systemic use of
impeachment in presidential democracies, including our own, should not be feared. It is likely to do
more good than harm.
I.

The Irresistible Rise of Impeachment: Snapshots from the World of Presidential
Removal

We begin by considering the three most recent cases of successful removal by impeachment—
in South Korea, Brazil and Paraguay—along with the removal of Jacob Zuma midway through his
second term in South Africa as a consequence of a protracted corruption-related investigation. These
case studies are useful for “clarifying previously obscure theoretical relationships” and as a step toward
“richer models” that would be enabled by purely large-n analysis.32 The case study approach is
especially appropriate here because, as we demonstrate in Part II, the rate of successful impeachments
in the past half century or so turns out to be small in comparison to the denominator of elected chief
executives holding office, or even the number of proposals for impeachment.33 Impeachment is often
proposed and rarely realized. A case-study approach allows a thick account of most of the relevant
See, e.g., ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE CASE FOR IMPEACHMENT (2017); cf. ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE AGAINST
IMPEACHING TRUMP (2018). At the very least, this tide of books provides evidence of the impoverished imagination of
book publishers when it comes to titles.
31

32

Timothy J. McKeown, Case studies and the limits of the quantitative worldview, in RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE
153 (Henry E. Brady & David Collier eds., 2004).

TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS 139,
33

See infra Table 1 (finding 10 removals in 154 attempts since 1990).
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positive instances of impeachment or removal that would be missed by a large-n analysis alone. Finally,
by way of counterpoint (and to tee up our normative analysis in Part III), we recapitulate briefly the
historical framing and practice of impeachment in the United States as a point of reference and
contrast.
In each of our case studies, directly elected presidents did not finish their terms, albeit for
different reasons. South Korea’s Park Geun-Hye was removed from office in 2017 after an
impeachment confirmed by the Constitutional Court. Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff was removed in 2016
shortly after her re-election to a second term in relation to an alleged fraud scheme. And Paraguay’s
Fernando Lugo was removed from office in 2012, primarily on the grounds that he had botched policy
decisions prior to and after a massacre involving a land invasion. In each of these cases, the ousted
presidents were extremely unpopular. Their ouster constituted a political opening, moreover, for
political opponents, who gained new access to the levers of power. In South Africa, in contrast,
president Jacob Zuma was replaced by a leader of his own party, after losing support within the party.
In our view, all these removals had normative justifications. But the political outcomes they
produced were radically different. For example, after removing the incumbent, South Koreans elected
a left-wing candidate, Moon Jae-In, while Brazilians elected a fiery right-wing populist, Jair Bolsonaro.
His tenure is still too new to evaluate, but concerns about democratic backsliding and state violence
have deepened. In contrast, Zuma was replaced by his co-partisan Cyril Ramaphosa, who went on to
lead the African National Congress (ANC) party to a close election win. In most of these cases, the
system has found a new equilibrium, and democracy has not fallen.
A.

South Korea: The Park Impeachment

South Korea’s constitution allows a majority of members of the National Assembly to propose
an impeachment bill for the president, which bill must be approved by a two-thirds vote.34 The
President is immediately suspended from serving; his or her duties pass on to the Prime Minister. In
a second stage, the impeachment motion then goes to the Constitutional Court for final approval. The
South Korean constitution allows impeachment for a “violation of the Constitution or other laws in
the performance of official duties.”35
In the first Korean impeachment of the twenty-first century, this last step proved dispositive.
In 2004, President Roh Moo-hyun was impeached.36 Before the Constitutional Court could decide on
the question of removal, an intervening parliamentary election gave Roh’s party a slim parliamentary
majority.37 The Court, perhaps in a move of political pragmatism, decided that the charges against Reh
were not sufficient to warrant removal.38 Roh went on to serve to the end of his term, though he
eventually committed suicide during a corruption probe.39 The Constitutional Court’s decision was
systemically important for clarifying many of the relevant rules.40 Most importantly, it held that even
34

CONST. S. KOREA, ART. 65 (1987).

35

See id.

Youngjae Lee, Law, politics, and impeachment: The impeachment of Roh Moo-hyun from a comparative constitutional perspective 53
AM. J. COMP. L. 403 (2005).
36

37

Id. at 412.

38

Id. at 418-19.

See Martin Fackler, Recriminations and Regrets Follow Suicide of South Korean Former President, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2009, at
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/world/asia/25iht-korea.html.
39

40

See Lee, supra note 36, at 413.
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if charges against a president were well-founded, removal should only occur if there was a “grave
violation” of law and if removal was “necessary to rehabilitate the damaged constitutional order.”41
The Court also explained the division of labor in impeachment cases, holding that the Assembly had
a political and fact-finding role, while the bench itself was the ultimate judge of whether the facts
presented met the legal threshold for removal.42
A decade later, a second South Korean president faced defenestration. This time the judiciary
ratified some of the grounds for impeachment. President Park Geun-Hye, like most Korean
presidents, found her popularity dropping precipitously after her 2012 election.43 In 2016, it was
revealed that she had been taking instruction from, and acting on behalf of, a close confident, Choi
Soon-sil.44 Choi’s father had been the head of a secretive cult and an associate of Park’s father. Choi
had been extorting money from Korea’s large business corporations. When these facts were revealed,
the opposition party filed impeachment motions against Park.45 The charges included seven counts,
including, inter alia, abuse of power, violating the duty of confidentiality by sharing government
documents with Choi, and violation of the right to life in the Sewol ferry disaster, which had taken the
lives of hundreds of high school students in 2014. Several members of Park’s own Saenuri party joined
in passing the motion by the required two-thirds vote, and Park was suspended as president.46 As in
Roh’s case, the Constitutional Court then initiated its proceedings.
On March 10, 2017, the Court delivered a verdict upholding Park’s impeachment on three of
the seven counts: violation of the obligation to serve the public interest, infringement upon private
property rights, and violation of confidentiality.47 Her interactions with the “shaman or mystic” Choi
were central to this finding,48 as they were to the growing tide of public anger at her administration’s
corruption.49 The Court did not accept three other grounds for impeachment, including one based on
allegations related to the Sewol Ferry disaster, and it found a final charge -- the “obligation to faithfully
execute the duties” of the President – to be non-justiciable.50 The Court then held that these charges
met the test for seriousness laid out during the Roh impeachment case because they gave a private
citizen influence over the office of the presidency.51 Park was subsequently convicted in criminal court.
She is currently serving a 25-year prison term.52
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Under the South Korean constitution, an impeached president is replaced by the prime
minister, a weak vice-presidential figure without independent executive authority. Moreover, the prime
minister assumes presidential duties as soon as the impeachment charge is approved by the National
Assembly, while the Constitutional Court conducts its trial. Importantly, though, the Acting
Presidency lasts only until a new presidential election can be held, a period of no more than sixty
days.53 After Park’s removal, Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn remained in office until new elections
in May 2017 brought in Moon Jae-In.54
In our view, the removal of President Park before her five-year term ended was a model of
procedural integrity. The impeachment decision by the Constitutional Court laid out in depth the
extent to which Park had given over the public trust to a private individual, with no official position
or relevant experience. The Court’s judgment, moreover, provides a model of sober evaluation of the
evidence, rejecting superfluous charges while upholding those for which the evidence was clear. At
the same time, the Court’s careful election of some impeachment grounds over others seems to have
tracked the nature of public discontent at the perceived dysfunctionality of the Park government.
B.

Brazil: The Rousseff Ouster

Shortly after Dilma Rousseff had been elected to her second term in office as Brazil’s
President, a scandal known as “Car Wash” revealed massive corruption tied to Brazil’s state-owned
oil company during the period she had been in charge of it before becoming president.55 Though no
evidence emerged that she was personally involved, Rousseff was held politically responsible for the
failings of her party’s (the Worker’s Party, or “PT”) long period in governance. With public discontent
at PT’s perceived corruption rising, opponents began to look for a hook to remove her. In late 2015,
Rousseff was charged with a violation of article 85 of the Constitution, which details the grounds for
impeachment. Just like previous presidencies, Rousseff’s administration had engaged in an accounting
maneuver to try to make it look as if the government had more assets than it did. The maneuver
allowed it to allocate funds to social programs without direct allocation from Congress. A tax court
held the maneuver to be illegal, opening the door to an impeachment that many analysts believed to
be primarily partisan.56
The substantive grounds for impeachment in the Brazilian constitution are ambiguous. Article
85 states:
acts of the President of the Republic that are attempts against the Federal Constitution
are impeachable offenses, especially those against the: I. existence of the Union; II.
free exercise of the powers of the Legislature, Judiciary, Public Ministry and
constitutional powers of the units of the Federation; III. exercise of political, individual
and social rights; IV. internal security of the Country; V. probity in administration; VI.
the budget law; [and] VII. compliance with the laws and court decisions.57
Article 85 of the Brazilian constitution thus lays out a fairly broad, and reasonably political (as opposed
to legal) standard for impeachment, that seems to reach well beyond criminality. It also includes a “by
53
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law” clause giving legislation the power to further define both the standards and process for
impeachment. The relevant law, Law 1079, was passed in 1950, and so predates the current
constitution of 1988, although the law was amended more recently.58 The law, oddly, conflicts with
the constitutional text in certain key respects. Some commentators have suggested the law may play a
bigger influence on impeachment in practice than the constitution itself.59 The law fleshes out the
broader categories found in Article 85, but still maintains a definition of those terms that is highly
political in nature.
The allegations against Rousseff focused on crimes against the administration and the budget,
chiefly as noted above that she disbursed public money without congressional authorization.60 The
allegations also linked Rousseff to the “Car Wash” scandal, albeit indirectly. More specifically, it was
argued that she had failed to act with sufficient vigor against the scandal and its participants.61 This
latter allegation, however, did not become the basis for impeachment, which instead focused (at least
formally) solely on the alleged illegal appropriations.62
Article 86 of the constitution fleshes out the bare bones of the process of impeachment of the
president, which again is regulated more closely in Law 1079 and in internal congressional bylaws. 63
Under that process, the lower House investigates accusations and decides whether to impeach the
president, by a two-thirds vote. Cases then proceed either to the Senate (in cases of “impeachable
offenses” defined in article 85) or the Supreme Court (in cases of “common crimes”), for the final
trial. Once the Senate begins removal proceedings, the president is suspended for up to 180 days
during the trial. A two-thirds vote of the Senate is required to remove officials from office for
commission of an “impeachable offense.” As in the United States, the President of the Supreme Court
must be present and must presides over the trial that occurs in the Senate.64
In 2016, Rousseff was formally impeached by the required two-thirds vote in the lower house
on a vote of 367 to 13, and trial commenced in the Senate. When the Senate voted to initiate removal
proceedings, Rousseff was suspended and Vice-President Michel Temer took over as acting president.
Temer retained this position after the Senate voted on September 1 to remove Dilma from office,
again by a two-thirds vote of 61 to 20, from August 2016 until the end of 2018. But at the same time,
the Senate failed to reach a two-thirds supermajority to deprive Rousseff or her political rights for
eight years. As a result, she retained the ability to run for future office (and indeed ran unsuccessfully,
for a Senate seat in 2018).65

58

See Law 1079 of 1950.
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The Supreme Court played a complex, multi-layered role throughout the episode as an agendasetter and adjudicator of key procedural choices. Unlike its South Korean analogue, however, it
exercised no ex post review once the legislative part of the impeachment process had come to its
conclusion. Actors on all sides of the political spectrum bombarded the bench with a series of
challenges and requests throughout the impeachment process. The Court’s response was mixed. On
the one hand, the Court generally avoided judging the substantive question of whether the allegations
against Rousseff were sufficient for impeachment, demurring to the legislature.66 On the other hand,
it issued some judgments that impacted the process in meaningful ways. For example, the Court issued
a ruling in December 2015, when the impeachment process was just beginning, that allowed the
process to go forward but held that the committee investigating Rousseff needed to be reconstituted
because it had previously been stacked with proponents of impeachment, in violation of the relevant
laws and regulations.67 The committee, directed the Court, needed to be proportional to the
composition of the House.68 The Court also held that the Senate, as well as the House, should issue a
preliminary vote on whether to accept the impeachment allegation against Rousseff.69
It is worth noting that, as in South Korea, the recent Brazilian impeachment had a historical
precursor. This was Fernando Collor de Mello’s ouster in 1992, shortly after Brazil’s transition to
democracy.70 The latter shared key features with Rousseff’s removal. As with Rousseff, political
context rendered Collor vulnerable to impeachment. He was an ‘outsider’ president without strong
ties to existing parties; he hence had great difficulty building a governing legislative coalition. Collor
was forced to resort aggressively to unilateral decree powers because of his lack of partisan support,
often reissuing provisional decrees before they could expire.71 Opponents alleged that this practice
was abusive. It was eventually restricted by the Supreme Court and then by a constitutional
amendment.72
The immediate triggers for Collor’s impeachment were corruption allegations. The House’s
charges did not allege crimes, but rather facilitating “the breach of law and order” and for behaving
in a way that was inconsistent with the “dignity” of the presidential office.73 Collor argued that nonfor eight years is an automatic consequence of impeachment and removal, although the text of Law 1079 contemplates
two distinct votes. See Rattinger, supra note 59, at 144-45.
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criminal acts could not be the basis for impeachment. But the House and Senate proceeded to impeach
him regardless. Collor technically resigned before the impeachment was completed, but the Congress
nonetheless finished the process, with the Senate voting in favor by an overwhelming 76-3 vote. As
in the Rousseff impeachment, judges played a major role in Collor’s: the president of the Supreme
Court, in his role presiding over the Senate trial, crafted special rules that simplified and streamlined
some of the procedures found in Law 1079.74
What lessons does the Rousseff impeachment (and its echoes in the Collor impeachment) hold
for the comparative study of presidential removal? To begin with, unlike the Park ouster in South
Korea, it is hard to conceptualize Rousseff’s impeachment as being about criminal behavior, or even
serious moral wrongs, of the president herself. The acts that formed the basis of her impeachment –
basically, accounting tricks and related devices to authorize additional social spending, allegedly with
the intent of helping the PT retain power – had been engaged in by presidents prior to Rousseff. Even
the broader context for the allegations and impeachment, which revolved around alleged involvement
with the car wash investigation, did not yield much evidence inculpating Rousseff herself. Rather, she
was accused of negligence in handling accusations and being connected to involved actors. But these
accusations did not meaningfully distinguish her from the larger political class. It is perhaps
unsurprising that Rousseff’s impeachment prompted outcry in some quarters and was described by
her and her allies as a coup.75
The political framing of the impeachment resonates even more when Brazil’s recent political
history is brought into the analysis. Rousseff’s 2014 reelection campaign had been fought in a context
where the revelations of the ‘Car Wash’ investigation started to discredit the country’s political class
as a whole. When she won reelection in 2014, it was by a much smaller margin than in 2010.76 Indeed,
her PT party lost support in Congress. In consequence, it was forced to rely on a more fluid pattern
of support without a clear majority coalition to legislate. The president of the House, Eduardo Cunha,
was never an ally of the regime and became strongly opposed to it in mid-July; his party (the second
largest in the House) turned against Rousseff during the impeachment process, depriving her of
needed support. The theory of the case against Rousseff also “echoed street protests” against the PT
more generally.77 At the time, the economy in Brazil was also experiencing an extended period of
stagnation.78
But, crucially, the impeachment did not reset the political system. New presidential elections
did not occur until 2018. Instead, Vice President Temer took over the chief executive’s role. As a
result, PT allies saw the impeachment, as well as related actions like the jailing of former president
Lula, as an attempt by more traditional and conservative actors to take down its most organized
progressive force, the PT.79 Temer served for about two and a half years after Rousseff’s suspension,
but was a weak and unpopular president. He had already been implicated in corruption more directly
74

See id. at 149.

75

See Benvindo, Abusive Impeachment?, supra note 66.
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than Rousseff, as were many of those who remained in Congress.80 The discrediting of Brazil’s political
class en masse continued; space thus opened for self-styled outsider and right-wing populist Jair
Bolsonaro to win election in 2018.
C.

Paraguay: The Removal of Lugo

The removal of Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo by Congress in 2012 is another case
which is difficult to understand as the removal of a criminal or morally depraved leader. A former
Catholic bishop and political outsider, Lugo won the presidency in 2008 on the ticket of a small party
and in alliance with seven other political parties, thus ending over sixty years of rule by the Colorado
Party.81 In return for the support of the largest opposition party, the Liberal party, he picked an insider
vice president, Federico Franco, with Liberal bona fides.82 Lugo and his vice-president were not close.
There were rumors from early in Lugo’s term that the Liberals were seeking to supplant him with
Franco.83 Further, Lugo was unsuccessful at carrying out most of his initially ambitious political and
economic programs, especially on his signature issue of land reform, and over time his popularity fell
sharply.84 He was unable to pass any significant legislation in a deeply divided Congress. His own
coalition remained highly factionalized.85 There was considerable instability during Lugo’s term, with
other impeachment attempts prior to the successful one. A failed military coup led to Lugo’s
replacement of the entire military leadership in 2009.86
The proximate cause for the Lugo impeachment was an incident on June 15, 2012, where 17
people (six police officers and eleven farmers) were killed.87 Landless farmers occupied land estates
that they alleged had been unlawfully acquired, leading to the clashes. The impeachment charges laid
against Lugo focused on this incident, as well as four others,88 and complained in general terms of
“bad performance in office.”89 Referring to the killings, the charging document also stated sweepingly
that Lugo had exercised power in an “inappropriate, negligent, and irresponsible way, generating
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constant confrontation and war between social classes.”90 It did not accuse Lugo, though, of
committing a crime. Like the Brazilian organic law, the Paraguayan constitution explicitly allowed
impeachment for poor political performance.91
sA “lightning” fast process of impeachment began and ended within the space of merely days.
On June 21, 2012, the Chamber of Deputies voted to impeach Lugo by a 76 to 1 vote; the next day,
on June 22, the Senate voted to remove him from office by a 39 to 4 vote. The rules required a twothirds vote of those present in the Chamber of Deputies for impeachment; and a two-thirds absolute
majority of members of the Senate for removal. Both thresholds were easily met.92 Under the
constitutional rules, the vice president and Liberal party member Federico Franco, who had become
a manifest opponent of Lugo, became president.93
Lugo and his allies complained of a lack of “due process” in his impeachment – they pointed
to the breathtaking speed of the impeachment and the fact that he was offered only two hours to
appear before the Senate to present his defense. Like Rousseff and her allies, he condemned the
removal as a “constitutional coup.” The leaders of many other countries in the region agreed.94
Paraguay was in fact suspended from regional organizations Mercosur and Unasur until the next set
of elections were held in the country, in 2013.95 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
issued a statement calling the speed with which the removal was carried out “unacceptable” and stating
that it was “highly questionable” that the removal of a Head of State could be “done within 24 hours
while still respecting the due process guarantees necessary for an impartial trial.”96 It concluded that
the speed of the procedure raised “profound questions as to its integrity.”97
It is hard to see the Paraguayan example, with its extraordinary speed, as a model of how
impeachment should be done. At the same time, the case most clearly shows how impeachment is
sometimes neither an exit from political crisis, nor even a judgment on the removed president. Like
the Rousseff removal, but even more clearly, the impeachment of Lugo really did not focus on his
culpable status as a ‘bad actor.’ The opponents of Lugo did not argue that he had committed a
statutory crime. Instead, they relied on his “poor performance of duties” [mal desempeno] in office, a
noncriminal ground of impeachment expressly contemplated in the Paraguayan constitution.98
As in the Park and the Rousseff cases, it appears that the decisive factor in Lugo’s
impeachment was the fragility of his political support. Lugo was removed because he had lost the
support of nearly the entire political class, including most of his own coalition, and was deeply
unpopular. The Liberal party, for example, resigned en masse from Lugo’s cabinet just before the
90
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impeachment began.99 Lugo appealed his removal to the Supreme Court, but the Court summarily
dismissed the petition in a brief order, using reasoning similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court when
confronted with challenges to impeachment procedures. It held that the process of impeachment was
delegated to the legislature and that the Court had no basis to intervene.100
In effect, then, the Paraguayan impeachment process operated as a (super-majoritarian) vote
of no confidence in the president. There are similar regime dynamics in the South Korean and
(especially) Brazilian contexts as well, where the criminal allegations sometimes seem to be used as
cover to remove unpopular presidents who had lost an enormous amount of congressional support.
The Paraguayan impeachment is the clearest case of removal operating to address systemic rather than
individualistic flaws.
D.

South Africa: The Ouster of Zuma

We now turn to a case in which a president was in effect removed (albeit in the end through
a resignation rather than the culmination of a formal process of removal): the ejection of President
Jacob Zuma from office in the middle of his term as South Africa’s president in early 2018. Although
South Africa has a President with a substantive rather than a ceremonial role, the 1996 South Africa
Constitution is nonetheless more akin to a parliamentary one than a presidential one. The president is
not directly elected by the public, but chosen by the parliament. Since 1996, the position has always
gone to the head of the dominant African National Congress (ANC). Under conditions of ANC
hegemony, the president will continue in office so long as he or she can maintain the support of
members of the party. But, under Section 89 of the Constitution, the president can be removed in the
event of a serious violation of the constitution or law, serious misconduct, or an inability to perform
the functions of the office.
The Zuma presidency was characterized by an acute crisis of corruption. During the tenure of
his predecessor Thabo Mbeki, an “ANC party state” developed in which party loyalists were assigned
to high posts in public office, parastatals came under party control rather than state control, and ANC
elites increasingly dominated the “commanding heights” of the private economy.101 During the Zuma
presidency, the state was captured by a small group of private actors, who steered public contracts to
preferred businesses in exchange for kickbacks.102 Ministers who declined to cooperate were quickly
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relieved of their duties and office.103 As a result of ineffectual or corrupt presidential leadership, a raft
of structural, macroeconomic problems accumulated.104
Zuma himself did not keep his hands clean. His country “Nkandla” residence in KwaZulu
Natal became an epicenter of public controversy as a result of publicly-funded security upgrade
ultimately costing some R246 million.105 At least initially, the ANC resisted attempts to hold him
accountable. Without an internal check inside his party, and with that party playing a dominant role in
the country’s politics, there was a real risk of the erosion of democracy itself. But the prosecuting and
investigating institutions of the state were not particularly active in seeking to hold Zuma accountable.
Only the Public Protector, an ombudsman-like body with relatively weak powers, seemed to be willing
to challenge Zuma’s corrupt behavior and the larger problem of state capture.
In this context, the Constitutional Court intervened several times to both protect opposition
rights within the parliament, and also to require parliament itself act to maintain and use mechanisms
for presidential accountability. Hence, the court strongly suggested that votes on no confidence in the
president had to be secret.106 It also insisted that minority rights in parliament not be squelched.107 It
then held that the Speaker of the House could not simply ignore a motions of no confidence
challenging Zuma’s continued tenure.108 Parliament had a duty to hear such motions, the Court
instructed.109 In a partiulcarly critical decision, the Court empowered the Public Protector, whose
findings were given legal force.110 The Public Protector had issued a report that followed an
investigation into the use of public funds for the improvement of the President’s Nklanda residence.
The report concluded that money misspent on portions of the upgrades were to be repaid by the
President. The President failed to comply with the findings, claiming that they constituted mere
“recommendations.”111 The Court, however, held that such findings were legally binding and that the
President was not entitled to disregard them. It also held that Parliament had to come up with a
mechanism to hold the president accountable. Importantly, the Public Protector’s report concluded
that in receiving undue benefits from the state, the President had “breached his constitutional
obligations.” Many regarded this statement, now imbued with the force of law, as fulfilling the criteria
for impeachment set forth in section 89(1) of the Constitution.112
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Despite this, Zuma subsequently survived a secret ballot of no-confidence in August 2017.113
The narrowness of the vote margin, though, demonstrated the extent to which Zuma and his allies
had lost support within the parliamentary ANC party. That information, aired publicly by the vote,
generated a credible public signal of the extent of dissatisfaction with the Zuma presidency. This
lowered the anticipated costs of defecting from that regime subsequently. It thus anticipated, and
rendered more likely, Zuma’s ultimate February 2018 ouster.114 The ANC effectuating a removal of
its own lexader is a remarkable instance of an intra-party check on power. Such intra-party checks are
quite rare in true presidential systems and are likely to reflect the strategic calculation of party insiders
of how to minimize electoral losses due to an unpopular elected figurehead.
In short, the South African Constitutional Court forced the political system to act. It did not
directly remove the president, but it ensured that the processes of democratic accountability could not
be ignored. The Public Protector also played the vital role of documenting “state capture” in a form
that Zuma could not easily ignore. At least formally, the Zuma case is a “near miss” rather than an
impeachment.115 But it illustrates how institutional processes can cause a collapse in public support
for a leader, which can make their continuance in office untenable. Across all these cases, the formal
processes of removal operated in tandem with, and were entangled in, changing public sentiment in
respect to the presence of not just personal malfeasance, but also a systemic crisis of governance. The
South African case thus confirms that presidential removal operates as a way of expressing concern
about systemic crisis, even if the causal relationship of legal censure mechanisms to public disapproval
varies from the earlier cases.
E.

Impeachment in the United States

With the recent cases of South Korea, Brazil, Paraguay, and South Africa in mind, it is useful
to return to the United States.116 Removing a sitting president in the United States through
impeachment has been described as “the most powerful weapon in the political armory, short of civil
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war.”117 Yet this is in some tension with the thinking at the Philadelphia Convention, where there is
evidence of a rather more capacious concept. The delegates to that Convention borrowed the
institution of impeachment from English law, where it had been a device to discipline and remove the
king’s ministers.118 Indeed, over the centuries, it provided a central power of parliamentary
accountability in the United Kingdom, but was not limited to serious crimes.119 Even while the debates
about the Constitution were ongoing, for example, Edmund Burke was spearheading an effort to
impeach Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General of India, for “high crimes and misdemeanors”
in the form of gross maladministration.120
The formation of the constitutional text on the substantive scope of impeachment followed
from one of those exchanges between two delegates that admits of speculation, inference, and endless
conjecture: One of the early iterations of the impeachment mechanism considered by the 1787
Constitutional Convention limited impeachment only to cases of treason or bribery.121 But George
Mason of Virginia worried that those bases would be insufficient to remove a president who
committed no crime but was inclined toward tyranny.122 Mason proposed adding “maladministration”
as a basis for impeachment and removal from office, which would have made our system more like a
parliamentary one. When James Madison objected that maladministration was a vague term, Mason
then proposed the usage “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” It was that
language that was ultimately adopted in the Constitutions.123 The Mason-Madison exchange suggests
that a narrow ‘bad actor’ model fails to exhaust impeachment’s purpose. Yet it also allows different
inferences about how far beyond that model the text was initially intended to protrude.
As a congressional report issued during the Nixon impeachment recounts, the phrase “High
Crimes and Misdemeanors” had been first used in 1386 during a procedure to remove Michael de la
Pole, the first Earl of Suffolk.124 The Earl’s failures included negligence in office, and embezzlement.
He had failed to follow parliamentary instructions for improvements to the king’s estate and had failed
to deliver the king’s ransom for the town of Ghent, letting it fall to the French as a result. For these
failures, Suffolk became the first official in English history to lose his office through impeachment.125
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Impeachment was subsequently used episodically throughout English history,126 before falling into
desuetude with the creation of modern parties and the emergence of the “ministerial responsibility”
principle.127 Under ministerial responsibility, a minister can be removed simply on a lack of confidence,
which makes removal a purely political matter without need for a legal proceeding. Impeachment was
last used in the United Kingdom in 1806.128 Drawing on this history, the Nixon-era congressional
report concludes that “the scope of impeachment was not viewed narrowly.”129
The ratification debates contain further evidence of this “political” understanding. Hence,
Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 65 explained that impeachment would be addressed at “those
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or
violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.”130 Subsequently,
Madison speaking at the Virginia ratification convention for the Constitution, intimated a
fundamentally political purpose to impeachment. When George Mason raised concerns about the
breadth of the pardon power and the possibility that a president would use it to establish tyranny,
noting that a president could use it to pardon crimes that “were advised by himself.” Madison
responded that impeachment would be the appropriate remedy in such a case: There is one security
in this case to which gentlemen may not have adverted: if the President be connected, in any suspicious
manner, with any person, and there be grounds to believe he will shelter him, the House of
Representatives can impeach him; they can remove him if found guilty; they can suspend him when
suspected, and the power will devolve on the Vice-President.”131 Consistent with this evidence, most
impeachment scholars in the United States have argued that the substantive standard reaches beyond
crimes, although there are debates how exactly how broad the standard is132 Scholars tend to conclude,
consistent with the original understanding, that impeachable offenses must be “abuses against the
state” that are analogous, in injury and intention, to those that concerned the founders.133
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But in the practice of impeachment, original understanding has not been destiny. Stephen
Griffin’s examination of the historical record of presidential impeachments shows that “the historical
reality of the Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton impeachments is quite different.”134 Rather than hewing to
the broader “Hamiltonian” reading of impeachment, as Griffin calls it, presidents and their supporters
have since the early nineteenth century articulated a narrower alternative—and have largely prevailed.
On this narrower view, “Presidents could be impeached only when the opposing party controlled
Congress, and then only for committing indictable crimes, or at least significant violations of law.” 135
As noted in the introduction, debates during both the Clinton and the Trump impeachments have
reflected and deepened this conflation between serious crime and impeachment.
During the Johnson impeachment, for example, “Congress wanted to impeach Johnson for
abusing his constitutional powers to obstruct the enforcement of federal laws.”136 But the actual
process centered mostly around Johnson’s supposed violation of the Tenure in Office Act by
dismissing Edward Stanton from his post as Secretary of War.137 Since this was not really a crime in
any conventional sense, but rather something more akin to an abuse of power, the tension between
different models of impeachment was apparent. In contrast, during the Clinton impeachment, the
House of Representatives seemed to proceed under a more legalistic conception of the impeachment
power. Three of the charges formulated by the House spoke directly to alleged crimes committed by
Clinton: two counts of perjury and obstruction of justice. Two of these three counts passed the House
and formed the basis on which Clinton was impeached; the third narrowly failed. In contrast, a single
count of abuse of power failed overwhelmingly in a 148-285 vote.138 Similarly, during the weeks leading
up the impeachment vote of Donald Trump, many possible charges were put forward, but the final
charges were two: abuse of power and obstruction of Congress. The abuse of power count, as well,
was criticized by President Trump’s team as legally deficient on the grounds that it did not allege the
violation of clearly-established law, and particularly of a crime.139
Another reason for the dominance of a narrow, criminally-focused understanding of
impeachment (one not stressed by Griffin) may be the manner in which the text is formulated. The
Constitution is normally read to create a unified impeachment standard that includes judges, high
political officials, and chief executives.140 Removing only bad actors, essentially convicted criminals,
makes good sense in the removal of judges as a way to protect judicial independence. Yet the same
standard applied to chief executives may inhibit impeachment from playing an exit role during severe
crises, or at least may force actors to make disingenuous statements during impeachment processes.
If so, this would be an example of drafting choices having unanticipated, even pernicious, effects on
major elements of constitutional operation—a point to which we return in Part III.
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Beyond the question of impeachment’s substantive threshold, the law and the historical record
are sparse. Since the founding, there have been many resolutions of impeachment brought up against
federal officials. Twenty were formally impeached in the House of Representatives.141 Of these, fifteen
were federal judges, one was a Senator, one a cabinet member, and three, Andrew Johnson in 1868,
Bill Clinton in 1999, and Donald Trump in 2019, were sitting presidents.142 Of these, eight were
convicted after a trial in the Senate, and removed from office. No chief executive has ever been
removed from power following a Senate trial. The Clinton impeachment failed to achieve the requisite
two-thirds vote by a significant margin; the Johnson removal failed by a single vote, 35 to 19; and the
Trump impeachment [is ongoing at this writing].143
The difficulty and resulting infrequency of impeachment generates a perhaps troubling
dynamic: It elicits a surfeit of impeachment talk, and arguably improper invocations of the procedure.
Because impeachment attempts require a supermajority of two-third of Senators for removal, there is
a moral hazard dynamic inducing individual members in the House to introduce resolutions of
impeachment. Members can claim credit without having to take responsibility for the subsequent costs
of an impeachment that will almost certainly not proceed. As a result, almost every president has faced
an effort by members of Congress to use impeachment as a way to paint them as a bad actor. In
particular, in an increasingly polarized era, motions of impeachment have become somewhat routine,
even if the process has rarely advanced beyond the stage of introduction. (In the post-Watergate era,
Jimmy Carter is the only president not to have had such a motion introduced.). The Clinton
impeachment, in fact, was marred by these problems. Republicans wielded the report of special
counsel Kenneth Starr as a way to paint Clinton as a bad actor. The crux of the debate focused on
whether the acts that Clinton was accused of (essentially, lying under oath as part of a civil case about
sexual conduct) were sufficient to warrant impeachment. What got lost in this focus on the conduct
of one man were broader issues of political context: Republicans controlled the House and thus were
able to push through articles of impeachment, but they had nowhere close to the two-thirds majority
in the Senate needed to remove Clinton from office without substantial Democratic party votes. The
prospect of Democrats turning on Clinton was remote, given that his popularity remained high
throughout the impeachment process.
At the same time, historical practice has generated a more stable equilibrium with respect to
judges. The failed impeachment of Chief Justice Samuel Chase at the turn of the nineteenth century
helped establish some outer bounds on the impeachment power, at least as regards judges.144 It set a
precedent that mere disagreement with judicial decisions would not be grounds for ousting a judge.145
In the modern period, those judges who have been removed have generally been implicated in serious
crimes. To be sure, Congress has not always felt tightly tethered to the judicial process in carrying out
impeachment. Then-judge Alcee Hastings, for example, was impeached and removed by Congress
(and later elected to the House of Representatives!) for acts that he had previously been acquitted of
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before a criminal jury.146 Even in the Hastings case, though, the impeachment of judges in the modern
period has generally been understood to be tethered to involvement in criminal acts.
Beyond this, one of the most striking regularities of historical practice in the U.S. is the absence
(especially in comparison to the South Korean, Brazilian, and South African examples) of any real role
for the courts.147 The Supreme Court has identified impeachment as the quintessential political
question that precludes virtually all judicial review.148 The Court has found issues related to
impeachment non-justiciable, mostly because the text of the constitution committed them “sole[ly]”
to the two houses of Congress.149 Since no constitutional text in fact prohibits the Court from
supervising legislative action (as it does in many other domains, this decision is perhaps better explaine
by pragmatic factors, such as the chaos that could ensue if there was a constitutional challenge to the
removal of the president, and by the difficulty of crafting standards to figure out what terms like “try”
mean in the context of an impeachment. One implication of this relatively light judicial touch is that
there has been no ‘over-legalization’ of impeachment. This at least leaves open the possibility of
impeachment being deployed as an exit from severe political crisis.
In summary, impeachment in the U.S. context is marked by the gap between original
expectations and incentive-compatible practice. Instead of a serious tool to remove a president in
moments of systemic risk, impeachment talk has become an instrument of political harassment. On
one view, therefore, it is possible to characterize the U.S. system of impeachment as marked by the
worst of both worlds – an ineffective tool that nonetheless has become highly politicized.
F.

Conclusion

Except for the United States—where the impeachment of chief executives has largely fallen
into desuetude beyond the context of partisan cheap talk—there is a tight connection between removal
mechanisms for chief executives and the presence of a systemic crisis. Where both political elites and
the public perceive a regime as unable to operate effectively (for whatever reason), they are inclined
to support removal. Removal in the global context is not a matter of individual malfeasance. Rather,
these case studies suggest, impeachment can work as a systemic remedy triggered in moments of deep
confidence crises among the public. Whether this conclusion can be sustained by a broader
consideration of large-n comparative evidence is the question to which we turn next.
II.

The Dynamics of Impeachment in Global Perspective

The case studies presented in Part I suggest that the term “impeachment” is in practice a catchall for a range of different practices. In this Part, we ask how frequently one observes different
substantive and procedural versions of impeachment across different jurisdictions in different periods.
As noted in the introduction, we focus on the removal of fixed-term presidents. The most important
examples of these are in presidential systems like the United States, where a chief executive who selects
the government and has at least some constitutional lawmaking authority is selected by direct elections
146
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and survives for a fixed term of years,150 or in semi-presidential systems like France, where a fixedterm president coexists with a prime minister and both figures may have substantial power.151 But
some parliamentary systems (such as Austria) also have fixed-term presidents who serve as heads of
state with no real governmental power; we include removal of these figures as well in our dataset,
though the cases are rare. In appropriate instances, we provide separate statistics for subsets, such as
presidential and semi-presidential systems. We draw many of the statistics and analyses that follow
from the Comparative Constitutions Project, a comprehensive inventory of the provisions of written
constitutions for all independent states between 1789 and 2006, with data updated through 2017.152
A.

Impeachment from Text to Practice

It is very common for democratic constitutions to provide for removal of the head of state
under some conditions. As of 2017, 90 percent of presidential and semi-presidential regimes had
constitutional rules that laid out a process for removal, either for incompetence, criminal action or
some other basis.153 The procedures differ widely on such issues as the basis for dismissal, the process
of proposal for dismissal, the process of approval, the period of the term of office within which the
President’s mandate can be revoked, and the various timing of different steps. But they are matters of
constitutional text, not of statutory enactment. Yet as the case of Brazil shows, the fact of
constitutional entrenchment does not necessarily preclude the enactment of statutes with important
effects on the process.154 We focus here, however, mainly on constitutional text. Thus, due caution
should be exercised in drawing inferences about how that text interacts with statutory supplements or
institutional cultures. In this section we first provide some basic empirics about the frequency of
impeachment, and then lay out some examples of the range of provisions.
The ubiquity of constitutional text on impeachment is matched by a similar pervasiveness of
attempts to remove presidents. Although attempts are not rare, they are rarely successful. One scholar,
Young Hun Kim, notes that some 45 percent of new presidential democracies faced an impeachment
attempt in the period 1974-2003, and that nearly a quarter of presidents who served in this period
were subjected to an attempt.155 Such attempts can vary in seriousness, ranging from mere calls by
some set of legislators for impeachment to full formal votes in the parliament. Defined as a mere
proposal in the legislature, attempts are exceedingly common. Supplementing Kim’s data, we gathered
data on all such attempts between 1990 and 2018, and found at least 210 proposals in 63 countries,
against 127 different heads of state. Using Kim’s fourfold framework for level of attempt, we identified
the highest level of seriousness in each attempt, and report these in Table 1. We add the first two
rows to get the total number of proposals, though acknowledge there is some difficulty distinguishing
different attempts.
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Table 1: Frequency of Impeachment Attempts 1990-2018
Level

1990-99

2000-2009

2010-18

Total

1=proposal by some
deputies to impeach

33

80

30

143

21

36

10

67

3

11

6

20

7

8

8

23

5

4

3

12

3

4

3

10

2=unsuccessful
attempt to place the
question on the
parliamentary agenda
3=parliament votes
on impeachment but
motion fails
4=parliament passes
an impeachment
vote
Head of state leaves
office before process
complete156
Removal through
impeachment

These attempts are not uniformly distributed. Impeachment is quite common in some
countries: the Ukraine, for example, has featured 25 different proposals in the 28 year-period we
examine. Other countries with frequent calls include Nigeria (17), South Korea (14), Ecuador (13),
the Philippines (12) and Brazil (11). Russia had 14 attempts in the tumultuous 1990s, but none since
Vladimir Putin came to power. These are countries, one migh speculate, where ordinary processes of
political bargaining have broken down, leading parties to escalate quickly to the ultimate weapon in
the political arsenal.
As the last row in Table 1 demonstrates, successful removal by impeachment is a rarity. We
identify ten total cases since 1990, listed on Table 2 below.157 Close inspection of these cases suggests
that successful removal typically involves a situation in which the opposition has control of the
parliament and is also able to convince some members of the president’s party to defect. But this is
not likely to occur because of certain structural features. Both attempts and removals are more

This row includes some cases in which an impeachment vote was held, but the president was either removed
beforehand or resigned, and so does not count as being formally removed by impeachment. For example, President
Victor Yanukovych was deposed in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2014, fleeing to Ukraine. Parliament voted to
remove him from office for being unable to fulfill his duties but did not pass formal articles of impeachment..
156
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frequent when the president is unpopular and does not have a majority of support in the legislature.
They often occur in the context of structural shifts in the larger party system.158
Presidential systems are characterized by single individuals who enjoy popular appeal but may
not necessarily have strong roles within their own parties.159 Party leaders may have a good deal of
trouble controlling their presidential candidate once in office (and so the occasionally rocky relations
between President Trump and congressional leaders of the Republican Party are less atypical than one
might expect). While one might assume that this would lead to parties turning against their presidents
on occasion, the linked electoral fates of parties in the legislative and executive branches mean that
they have relatively weak incentives to do so (even if they do control the levers of impeachment or
removal).160 At the very least, to impeach one’s own party leader implies that the party was incompetent
in choosing the person as candidate. Worse, it might catalyze a fragmentation of the party, as the
spurned leader breaks off with his or her own political coalition.
To illustrate why it is that removing presidents is so hard even when their party turns against
them, consider the attempt to dismiss President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka. In 1991, a motion
to impeach Premadasa was raised in the parliament, and was supported by some members of his own
party who came from a higher caste.161 Premadasa was able to expel dissident members from the party,
which meant, in accordance with the text of the Sri Lankan Constitution, that they lost their seats in
parliament. Other instances of failed attempts in presidential systems to use impeachment for
intraparty conflict include the case of South Korea’s Roh Moo-hyun, as discussed above in Part I.
Recall that Roh was impeached but not removed by the country’s Constitutional Court, as it found
that the violations were not so severe as to justify a removal from office.162 Again, because Roh
maintained public support, and his party was faring well at the polls, there was a close alignment of
interests between chief executive and party. Under those circumstances, impeachment will rarely
occur.
In the context of pure presidential systems, we have been able to locate one case of a party’s
legislative majority voting to remove its own president. That was Raul Cubas Grau in Paraguay, in
1999, who resigned after his impeachment by the Chamber of Deputies and just before a Senate vote
that would have completed his removal from office.163 Cubas had won the party’s nomination only
because the party leader had been jailed for a coup attempt. After a political assassination, another
faction in his party attempted to impeach him in favor of its preferred candidate. This was successful
after a period of political turmoil. Samuels and Shugart attribute the successful removal to a rare
instance in which the party in question truly dominates the political scene and all levers of power.164
Intraparty fights thus substitute for the party-against-party competition that typically characterizes
general elections.
Kim’s analysis also finds that impeachment attempts are more common when the president is involved in political
scandal, and in systems with strong presidential powers. See Kim, supra note 155.
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SAMUELS AND SHUGART, supra note 157.

160

See id at 108.
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See id. at 112-114.

162

See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.

See Clifford Krauss, Paraguay Glides from Desperation to Euphoria, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, at
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/01/world/paraguay-glides-from-desperation-to-euphoria.html.
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See SAMUELS AND SHUGART, supra note 157, at 117.
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At the same time, it is sometimes the case that a handful of members of a president’s party
will join with others in an impeachment motion or threat. Such was the case when Richard Nixon
resigned under threat of impeachment in 1974. Other examples involving impeachment or related
mechanisms include Ecuador’s Abdala Bucaram in 1997 and Jamil Mahuad in 2000, Paraguay’s Raul
Cubas Garu in 1999, Venezuela’s Carlos Andres Perez in 1993, and Guatemala’s Otto Perez Molina
in 2015.165 In 2005, Ecuador’s Congress deposed Lucio Gutierrez from office for abandoning his
duties, though it did not have to complete the impeachment process because of his resignation.166 In
these cases, individual legislators’ interests plainly diverged from those of the party, perhaps because
of differences in the consistencies represented by different legislators within the same party, or perhaps
because of ideological divisions within the party.
Table 2 presents all the cases of successful removal of directly elected presidents through
impeachment since 1990. It shows that the phenomenon is not unknown. But it is also not particularly
common. It represents well less than half of 1% of all country-years in which impeachment might
have occurred. The final column of Table 2 also offers a threshold piece of evidence of the impact of
impeachment on the political system. It does so by tracking whether the country’s level of democracy
improves or declines as a result of impeachment. To measure democracy, we use the widely utilized
Polity2 index, which rates democratic quality on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (total autocracy) to
+10 (total democracy). By convention, scores of 6 or higher are considered full democracies. In the
column on the far right, we track the change in the Polity2 rating from two years prior to impeachment
to two years after.

In 2015 in Guatemala, the country’s Attorney General moved a motion for impeachment that was unanimously
approved by the Supreme Court. The President was facing allegations of corruptions. After the vote by the Supreme
Court, the President submitted a resignation that was unanimously accepted by Congress. Congress also unanimously
voted to strip him of his immunity from prosecution. This vote by Congress can thus be seen as akin to impeachment.
See Guatemala’s President Otto Perez Molina Resigns, BBC NEWS, Sept. 3, 2015, at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latinamerica-34137225.
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See A Coup by Congress and the Street, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 2005, at
https://www.economist.com/news/2005/04/25/a-coup-by-congress-and-the-street.
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Table 2: Successful presidential removals involving impeachment 1990-2017
Year

President

Polity
Score two
years
before

Brazil

1992

Fernando Collor

8

8

Venezuela

1993

Carlos Andres
Perez167

9

8

Madagascar

1996

Albert Zafy

9

7

-2

Peru

2000

Alberto
Fujimori168

1

9

+8

Philippines

2001

Joseph Estrada

8

8

0

Indonesia

2001

Abdurrahman
Wahid

6

6

0

Lithuania

2004

Rolandes Paksas169

10

10

0

Paraguay

2012

Fernando Lugo

8

9

+1

Brazil

2016

Dilma Rouseff

8

8

0

South Korea

2017

Park Geun-hye

8

8170

0

Country

Polity
Score two
years after

Change in
Polity score
from t-2 to
t+2
0
-1

Source: Archigos dataset supplemented by authors. Note that the result in the final column holds if we extend
the period to five years before and after impeachment, but data is then incomplete for the final two cases.
Indonesia, where the impeachment of Abdurrahman Wahid occurred just two years after the country became
a democracy, shifted from a score of -7 to 8 by this broader temporal metric.

It is first worth noting that every country that successfully impeached a president remained a
full democracy thereafter, in most cases without any change in the level of democracy. Even
Madagascar, where President Albert Zafy was impeached in 1996, remained a full democracy a few
The Perez removal may have been irregular – Congress declared the post “permanently vacant” after Perez fled the
country and the Supreme Court issued a preliminary ruling declaring the complaint to be well-founded, without waiting
for the Court’s impeachment trial to finish. See PEREZ-LINAN, supra note 83, at 21.
167

Fujimori had already fled the country in response to allegations of corruption and attempted to resign, but Congress
insisted on completing the impeachment proceeding. See id. at 184-85.
168

Paksas was impeached for violating the Lithuanian constitution and his oath of office. His impeachment followed
news that he had granted citizenship to a Russian businessman who was the main contributor to his campaign. After
being found guilty by the Seimas (National Parliament), he was removed from office on the same day. See Terry D.
Clark, Eglÿe Verseckaitÿe & Eglÿe Verseckaitÿe, PaksasGate: Lithuania Impeaches a President, 52 PROBS. OF POSTCOMMUNISM 16 (2005).
169

The score for 2018 is used for this draft. No change is anticipated for 2019, and the actual score will be entered
before final publication
170
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years later. Peru’s impeachment of Alberto Fujimori occurred as part of the restoration of democracy
after his period of autocratic rule, and hence we see a significant positive jump in that case.
To this list could be added several instances in which impeachment occurred but the President
was not removed, either because he or she was not convicted or because of extraconstitutional action.
Of course, U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and Donald Trump were examples of the former. Russian
president Boris Yeltsin was impeached in the early 1990s but dissolved parliament to stay in office. 171
Similarly, Alberto Fujimori’s “self-coup” in 1992 was followed by a vote to remove him, but Fujimori
had already dissolved Congress.172 There are also cases in which some kind of vote was held and the
president departed, but not through impeachment.173 In addition there have been at least eight formal
impeachment attempts that did not pass the legislature since 1990. Only the Russian case, which
occurred when Russia could be characterized as a semi-democracy in the midst of a tenuous (and
ultimately failed) transition from authoritarianism, led to a significant decline in the Polity score.
Finally, we note that the ultimate results of the Brazilian case are still ambiguous: Although Temer’s
rocky tenure was followed by a competitive election, it remains to be seen whether, or to what extent,
Jair Bolsonaro damages Brazil’s democratic structure.174 Early signs suggest that he may be effectively
constrained by the legislature.175
We further examined the 11 further instances in which a country held an impeachment vote
but the president either was not removed or left by means other than the formal impeachment process.
Only two of these led to a country’s level of democracy being eroded to fall outside the category.
These were the 2016 impeachment of Viktor Yanukovich, which led to him fleeing to Russia, in which
the country dropped from a scored of 6 two years before impeachment to 4 two years after, and the
2005 removal of Ecuador’s Lucio Gutiérrez, in which he fled the country before the legal proceeding
was complete, and led the country to drop from a score of 6 to 5 in the Polity scale. Of the 20 further
cases in which an impeachment vote was held but did not reach the required threshold, only one, the
2002 attempt against Ange-Félix Patassé in the Central African Republic, led to a decline from a score
of 5 (just below the conventional cutoff) to -1. In short, impeachment, whether or not it leads to
removal, does not seem to negatively impact the level of democracy in a country.
How have these instances of removal, as well as the calls for removal that inevitably precede
and surround them, emerged over time? Has there been a global ‘moment’ of impeachment? Figure 1
See Edward Morgan-Jones and Petra Schleiter, Governmental change in a president-parliamentary regime: The case of Russia
1994-2003, 20 POST-SOVIET AFF. 123 (2004).
171

172

CATHERINE M. CONAGHAN, FUJIMORI’S PERU: DECEPTION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE 31-32 (2006).

The case of Abdulla Bucaram, discussed below, is one example. See text at notes 226-232 infra. Viktor Yanukovych of
Ukraine was deposed in the Orange Revolution of 2014, and fled to Russia. A vote was held stripping him of his power
because he was unable to fulfill his duties, but no articles of impeachment were involved. See Maria Popova, Was
Yanukovych’s Removal Constitutional? PONARS Eurasia, Mar. 20, 2014, available at
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/was-yanukovych%E2%80%99s-removal-constitutional [last accessed Oct. 1,
2019]. In addition, presidents have sometimes resigned under threat of impeachment, as occurred with Richard Nixon in
the United States. For example, President Raul Cubas Grau resigned in Paraguay in 1999 after impeachment proceedings
had been initiated, and during a deep political crisis. See PEREZ-LINAN, supra note 168, at 32.
173

See, e.g., Robert Muggah, Can Brazil’s Democracy be Saved? N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2018, at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/opinion/brazil-election-bolsonaro-authoritarian.html.
174

Julio Zaiden Benvido The Party Fragmentation Paradox in Brazil, ICONnect blog, Oct. 24, 2019, available at
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2019/10/the-party-fragmentation-paradox-in-brazil-a-shield-against-authoritarianism/
[last accessed Oct. 24, 2019]
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provides a visual representation of the frequency of removal attempts since 1990, distinguishing calls
by a party in parliament from formal motions of impeachment. The data shows a rather constant
frequency of calls and removals around the world: Intriguingly, there is no uptick in the wake of the
2008-09 financial crisis, which is generally thought to have triggered a surge of populist discontent and
anti-democratic moves.176 Our prior was that this might have been an inflection point, triggering a
wave of calls to remove elected leaders who had forced by economic exigency to make unpopular
decisions. Contrary to our expectations, however, there is no concentrated moment of global
impeachments. We rather find a constant background drone of calls for impeachment.
Figure 1: Frequency of calls and removals
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Source: Data on file with authors

It is instructive to set this alongside Figure 2, which describes the relative frequency of democracies,
autocracies, and hybrid regimes in the same period.

See ADAM TOOZE, CRASHED: HOW A DECADE OF FINANCIAL CRISIS CHANGED THE WORLD (2018). For a more
general analysis of the relation of economic crisis and democracy, see Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic
Capitalism, 71 NEW LEFT REV. 5 (2011).
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Figure 2. The relative frequency of democracies, autocracies, and hybrid regimes

Source: Adapted from Freedom House data 2016
Comparison of these statistics and figures suggests that, in general and at least in terms of average
effects, there is little evidence that either talk of impeachment or impeachment itself is unhealthy for
a democratic political system. While there is one instance in which a president used the attempt at
impeachment to overthrow the parliament, few would argue that Russia in the early 1990s was a
democracy in any real sense, and Yeltsin’s parliamentary opponents were largely unreformed
communists.177 In virtually every other case, impeachment is used to remove an unpopular leader and
to recalibrate the political system. The relative ease of doing so, of course, depends on the substantive
basis for removal and procedural aspects. We turn now to these topics.
B.

The Global Grounds for Removal and Impeachment

This section presents data on the formal rules invoked in removal. The first necessary step
here is to map out the predicate conditions for removal. Table 3 summarizes the bases for removal of
heads of state as of 2017, as set forth in national constitutional texts. (Note that many constitutions
provide for multiple alternative grounds for removal and so there is no reason we would expect the
percentages to sum to one.) We first look at the universe of the 149 constitutional systems that provide

Writing in 2001, Lilia Shevtsova noted that the “fundamental problems of democratic development … have still not
been resolved.” Lilia Shevtsova, Ten Years After the Soviet Breakup: Russia's Hybrid Regime 12 J. DEM. 65, 65 (2001).
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for some such procedure, and then examine a subset of presidential and semi-presidential democracies
only. The vast majority of serious attempts at impeachment have taken place in such countries.
Table 3: Basis for removing heads of state178

Basis

Number of all
constitutions
providing for
removal

% of
constitutions

(n=149)

Presidential
& semipresidential
% of
democracies
constitutions
only (n=68)

Crimes

88

59

43

63

Violations of
the Constitution

69

46

19

28

Incapacity

55

37

19

28

Treason

51

34

19

28

General
dissatisfaction

20

13

7

10

Other

29

19

10

15

As Table 3 illustrates, the most common basis for head of state removal is criminal misconduct. But
apart from the United States, constitutions generally do not stipulate a requirement that crimes be
“high.” Indeed, the phrase “high crimes” seems to be limited to constitutions directly influenced by
the American one, including those of Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Philippines. Of these, only
the Philippines is a true presidential system.179 Its formulation is that the president and other high
officials can be removed “on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”180
At first glance this seems quite similar to the language of the American Constitution. But the Philippine
model of impeachment sweeps beyond the domain of criminal offenses to cover constitutional wrongs,
as well as “corruption,” which might include but not be exhausted by formal criminal offenses. In this
regard, even the Philippine model may sweep beyond the focus on individual criminality.

Presidential and semi-presidential democracies are coded by the Democracy and Dictatorship Dataset, as
supplemented by Christian Bjørnskov and Martin Rode. See Jose Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond
Vreeland. 2010. Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited, 143 PUBLIC CHOICE. 67 (2010); Christian Bjørnskov and Martin Rode,
Regime Types and Regime Changes: A New Dataset, ,manuscript, August, 2018, available at
http://www.christianbjoernskov.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Regimes-and-Regime-Change-August-2018.pdf
[last accessed August 1, 2018].
178

The head of state in the Marshall Islands is called a President, but can be removed on a vote of no confidence.
CONST. MARSHALL ISL., art. V., sec. 7 (1979).
179

180

CONST. PHILIPPINES, art IX, sec 2 (1987).
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Beyond criminal offenses, violations of the constitution or the president’s oath of office are
salso a common predicate for removal. A violation of the constitution may or may not be a crime in
a particular political system, but obviously goes to the core of the constitutional order. Several
countries in Africa stipulate that the violation must be “willful.”181 As Griffin has demonstrated, this
possibility has gradually fallen out of constitutional practice in the United States (although the Johnson
impeachment contains traces of the idea).182 That said, the “cheap talk” of impeachment echoing
through Capitol Hill, today as before, contains the idea that removal of a president can be grounded
on his or her constitutional infidelity.183
For our purposes, the most interesting category is what we label “general dissatisfaction” in
Table 3, which covers a variety of situations. In many countries, more general grounds for removal
blur the canonical distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems. For example, the
Constitution of Ghana allows the president to be removed by a two-thirds vote in the legislative
assembly for conducting himself in a manner “i. which brings or is likely to bring the high office of
President into disrepute, ridicule or contempt; or ii. prejudicial or inimical to the economy or the
security of the State,” as well as for reasons of incapacity or “violations of the oath of office.”184 This
formulation blends two different grounds for removal: policy dissatisfaction and misconduct.
Similarly, in Tanzania, the President can be removed if he “has conducted himself in a manner which
lowers the esteem of the office of President of the United Republic.”185 Uganda’s Constitution allows
the president to be removed for “conduct that brings hatred or contempt to office of president.”186
Honduras allows impeachment to proceed against “actions contrary to the Constitution of the
Republic or the national interest and for manifest negligence, inability, or incompetence in the exercise
of office.”187 These standards seem to spill over into the distinctly political bases of removal that
characterize the parliamentary system, in which the head of government is dependent on the
parliament for continued tenure. And like parliamentary systems, in many cases a legislature in a
presidential system can remove the executive under relatively broad criteria.
In short, the implication of the case studies—that formal impeachment operates in practice as
a vessel for the implementation of broad discontent with a particular regime—thus carries through in
the text of many constitutions.
C.

The Procedural Apparatus of Presidential Removal

Processes of removal typically involve multiple phases and different institutions. They are also
characterized by different voting thresholds (sometimes within the same document) and time limits.
These procedural details also sometimes vary along with the basis of the removal charge. This means

See CONST. GAMBIA, art 67(1) (1996); CONST. UGANDA, art. 107(1) (1995); CONST. ZIMBABWE, art.97(1) (2013);
CONST. GHANA, art. 69(1)(a) (1996).
181

182

See Griffin, supra note 28, at 1-2.

See, e.g., Katie Zezima, Obama Action on Immigration Should Spark Impeachment Talk, GOP Lawmaker Says, WASH. POST,
Aug. 3, 2014, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/08/03/obama-action-on-immigrationshould-spark-impeachment-talk-gop-lawmaker-says/.
183

184

CONST. GHANA, art. 69(1)(b) (1996).

185

CONST. TANZANIA, art 46A (1977).

186

CONST. UGANDA, art. 107(1)(b)(i) (1995).

187

CONST. HOND., art 234 (1982).
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that there is a good deal of complexity and variety. Table 4 provides the most common thresholds
and actors for all independent countries as of 2017.
Table 4: Most common removal procedures as of 2017 for all constitutions (n=194)
Legislative
threshold to
propose
(n)188

Who approves? (n)

Lower house (100)

2/3 (53)

Court/constitutional
2/3 (54)
council (61)

Both houses required
(19)

Majority (20)

Lower house (50)

3/4 (10)

Court/constitutional
council (9)

3/4 (7)

Upper house (17)

Majority (7)

Upper house (6)

3/5 (3)

Both houses
required (17)

Other (3)

Cabinet (5)

Other (30)

Public through
referendum (12)

-

Prime minister (4)

-

Cabinet (2)

-

Public through recall (4)

-

-

-

Who can propose? (n)

Legislative
threshold to
approve (n)189

Because of the complexity of the procedures, we organize our discussion by examining the
roles of distinct constitutional actors in the proposal, approval and confirmation of decisions to
remove a president.
1.

Legislatures

Impeachment is, as Hamilton noted long ago, a predominantly legislative procedure. This
means that it requires the aggregation of votes in one or more houses of a legislative body. Even if
not called impeachment, head of state removal typically begins with action in the legislature, either in
the lower house, the upper house, or both houses acting jointly. The most common vote threshold is
a two-thirds rule. Whether or not the legislature proposes removal, it often has a role in approving the
process. Again, the modal threshold is a two-thirds vote. There are some interesting variations. When
the legislature is bicameral, it is quite common for an upper house or the two chambers acting jointly
to be the body to approve the motion to remove a leader. In Ireland, which has a non-executive
Calculated by summing Comparative Constitutions Project variables HOSPDM1, HOSPDM2 and HOSPDM3,
corresponding to lower, upper and both houses.
188

Calculated by summing Comparative Constitutions Project variables HOSADM1, HOSADM2 and HOSADM3,
corresponding to lower, upper and both houses.
189
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president, two-thirds of either house can propose an impeachment, in which case the other house tries
the case and can remove with a two-thirds vote. In a small number of cases, however, the legislative
role is nondiscretionary. For example, in Fiji, the Prime Minister can propose the removal of the
President. Whether removal occurs in the case of allegations of misbehavior is then determined by a
tribunal of three judges.190 Parliament is required to accept the judgment of the panel.191
Legislative procedures sometimes involve constitutionally mandated actions by legislative
committees or other subparts of the chamber.192 In Tanzania, a written notice must be signed and
backed by at least 20 percent of Members of Parliament to be submitted to the Speaker of Parliament
at least 30 days prior to the sitting at which the motion of dismissal is to be moved.193 The next stage
entails a Special Committee of Inquiry, whose membership is to be voted upon by members of
Parliament.194 This is formed to investigate the charges levied against the President. During this period
of inquiry, the office of President is deemed vacant. After receiving a report from the Special
Committee, the National Assembly discusses the report, and can approve the charges by a two-thirds
supermajority vote of all MPs, in which case the President is removed.195
2.

Courts

The role of the judiciary in impeachment processes is complex and varied. At one end of the
spectrum is the United States, where the Constitution gives no role to the courts, and where the
Supreme Court has signaled that the national judiciary should play essentially no role in impeachment
procedures.196 On the other end of the scale is Honduras. There, until a 2013 amendment, the only
body with the power to remove high officials such as the president was the country’s Supreme Court.
Most constitutions steer a middle course between these poles. More in keeping with a quasilegal conception of impeachment, courts in many countries have a role in approving the removal of
the president. But the judicial role in impeachment varies quite widely. In some cases, courts may be
limited to ensuring that impeachment procedures are being carried out using the proper procedures
by political actors. In others, such as the South Korean constitution,197 courts may become involved
at the final, trial-like stage of impeachment, after the legislature has made an initial decision as to
whether impeachment is justified.198 A few constitutions also have multiple tracks for impeachment,
some dominated by the courts and some by legislators. For example, the Colombian constitution
provides that if the president is impeached for a “crime in the exercise of functions” or “unworthiness

190

See CONST. FIJI, art. 89

See id. (“In deciding whether to remove the President from office, Parliament must act in accordance with the advice
given by the tribunal….”).
191

See generally Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon Majorities, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 74 (2005) (defining
and exploring the use of submajority rules).
192

193

See CONST. TANZANIA, art. 46A(3)(a).

194

See id. art. 46A(3)(b), (4).

195

See id. art. 46A(9).

196

See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).

197

See supra Part I.A.

This is also a fairly common design in Latin America, at least for some kinds of impeachments (such as those
involving common crimes). See, e.g., CONST. EL SALVADOR, arts. 236-37 (1983); CONST. VEN., art. 266 (1999).
198

36

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3461120

for bad conduct,” the House impeaches and the final trial for removal is before the Senate.199 But
where a president is impeached for a common crime, the final trial instead occurs before the Criminal
Chamber of the Supreme Court.200 The Brazilian constitution contains a similar provision, with
roughly the same bifurcation of trial procedures between the Supreme Court and the Senate.201
The Honduran case, as noted, is especially interested because removal, before 2013, was
concentrated only in judicial hands. High officials had the right to be criminally tried only by the
Supreme Court; the Court had the power to suspend them during the pendency of the trial and could
remove them permanently upon conviction.202 The legislature had no textual removal power.203 These
provisions were important during the constitutional crisis involving President Manuel Zelaya in 2009,
which ended with a military intervention that deposed Zelaya.204 Most of the Congress and other
political officials clashed with Zelaya over his plans to hold a referendum on a potential Constituent
Assembly to replace the constitution; they alleged that his plans violated that law and constitution, and
that he was disobeying judicial orders.205 Zelaya initially had a sizable amount of support from his own
Liberal party (one of the two major parties in the Congress at the time), but his intra-party support
eroded sharply after his proposal for a Constituent Assembly and his forging of an alliance with Hugo
Chavez.206 However, the Congress was powerless to remove Zelaya from power directly, despite his
loss of elite support.
Early one morning shortly before Zelaya had planned a “non-binding” consultation on his
Constituent Assembly proposal, the heads of the branches of the military arrived at his home and put
him on a plane to Costa Rica.207 They later produced a supposed charging document and arrest warrant
issued by the Supreme Court for his detention. Evidence hinted it had been back-dated. At any rate it
would not explain why Zelaya was put on a plane to Costa Rica, rather than being brought before the
Supreme Court.208 The Congress met later that same day and declared the presidency to be “vacant”;
following the rules in the constitution, it voted then to ratify the vice-president to serve as president
for the rest of Zelaya’s term. Most of the rest of the world deemed the incident a coup–for example,

199

CONST. COL., art. 175 (1991).

200

See id.

201

See CONST BRAZ., art. 86 (1988).

CONST. HOND., art. 312(2). See also Norma C. Gutierrez, Law Library of Cong., Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues
(2009), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/honduras/constitutional-law-issues.php.
202

See Noah Feldman, David Landau, Brian Sheppard, and Leonidas Rosa-Suazo, Report to the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Honduras: Constitutional Issues 74-75 (2011), at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1915214 (discussing this unusual feature).
203

See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg et. al., On the Evasion of Executive Term Limits, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1807, 1810 (2011);
David E. Landau et al., From an Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment to an Unconstitutional Constitution? Lessons from
Honduras, 8 GLOB. CONST. 40, 50 (2019).
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See Landau et al., supra note 204, at 50.

See Mark J. Ruhl, Trouble in Central America: Honduras Unravels 21 J. DEMOCRACY 93, 96-97 (2010) (discussing Zelaya’s
relationship with the Liberal Party).
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See Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Cross-Currents in Latin America, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 114, 118 (2015).

See Feldman et al., supra note 203, at 15-16, 46 (explaining the content of the warrants and the difficulty with verifying
when they were issued).
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Honduras was suspended from the OAS because of an “unconstitutional interruption” in the
democratic order, a suspension that was lifted only after the next set of presidential elections in 2011.209
The highly legalistic nature of the Honduran impeachment process likely contributed to the
problems experienced during the removal of Zelaya. First, the process required an indictment and
conviction for an actual crime. It did not hinge, either formally or de facto, upon a broad and durable
loss of support or very poor political performance on Zelaya’s part. Second, the process was
technically in the hands of a court, rather than the legislature (although in fact, the final step in the
removal was provided by the military). The country subsequently amended its constitution to create a
legislative impeachment procedure in 2013, after Congress had (illegally at the time) removed several
members of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court.210 This suggests that leaving
impeachment exclusively in the hands of a judicial body can present risks of elite capture and can
squeeze out considerations of system-wide stability, preventing an exit even in situations where a
system desperately needs one.
3.

Public involvement

The public has a role in impeachment in several countries. In some cases the public can
approve the removal of the President by referendum. For example, in the Gambia, the Constitution
allows a vote of no confidence by the legislature, proposed by one-third of members and approved
by a two-thirds majority, in which case a referendum is called for the public to endorse or reject the
decision.211 In the Austrian semi-presidential system, the legislature can call a referendum on the
president’s impeachment, requiring a two-third vote of the upper house; if the referendum fails, the
upper house is disbanded.212 In Colombia, members the public may file complaints against the
President or other officials to the House of Representatives, which must then assess as the basis for
any impeachment resolution before the Senate.213 A two-thirds vote in the Senate is also required.
In keeping with their populist rhetorical emphasis on the “people”,214 several of the so-called
Bolivarian constitutions of Latin America also give the public a role in a recall procedure that shares
some features with impeachment. In Bolivia and Ecuador, the public can initiate the revocation of the
mandate of the President with 15 percent of registered voters proposing it.215 There are temporal
restrictions: in Bolivia it can only be invoked after at least half the term has elapsed, while in Ecuador
after thse first year (and in both countries so long as at least one year remains in the term).216 Similarly,
in Venezuela, 20 percent of registered voters can petition for a referendum to dismiss the President,
after at least half the term has elapsed.217 Only one petition to remove the President can be filed during
209
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the term of office.218 The absolute number of voters in favor of dismissal must be equal to or greater
than the number of voters who elected the President, and voters in favor of the dismissal must be
equal to or greater than 25 percent of the total number of registered voters.219
D.

Substitutes for Impeachment

We have focused so far on impeachment and cognate removal devices. But some constitutions
contain ther provisions that might be taken to be a substitute for the impeachment and removal of a
president under certain circumstances. A censure procedure is one example (and in fact there have
been four resolutions of censure against presidents in U.S. history.220) For removal, the main
alternative mechanisms are recall and removal for incapacity. In the United States, the latter is covered
by the 25th Amendment, which gives “the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers
of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide” the ability to
certify to Congress “their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office.”221 When such a declaration is made, the President is removed; the Vice President
then assumes the powers of the presidency.222
The most obvious application of the 25th Amendment is in cases where the president is
physically incapable of performing his or her duties because of complete incapacitation, say following
a catastrophic stroke.223 But some recent commentary has suggested applying it on far broader grounds
like mental instability or obvious unfitness to hold office, arguing further that these grounds might
apply to President Trump.224 This broader application of the 25th amendment (which remains as of
this writing hypothetical) may render it a partial substitute for impeachment.
Ecuador offers a cautionary example of how a similar substitute for impeachment might be
used to remove an incumbent president from office. The populist Abdala Bucaram was elected to the
presidency and took office in August 1996. His term would be a short one. His party was not the
largest party in Congress and in Ecuador’s highly fragmented party system, did not hold anywhere
near a majority of seats, making it hard for Bucaram to govern. 225 In addition, he took office in the
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midst of serious economic problems, and shifted from his prior populist stance to propose highly
unpopular neo-liberal austerity measures to deal with the crisis.226 Many of his former allies, such as
Ecuador’s indigenous parties and movements, abandoned him after he made these proposals.227
Bucaram nonetheless retained sufficient support to avoid impeachment and removal, which
would have needed a two-thirds supermajority in the Congress. Faced with this problem, opponents
of Bucaram turned to another constitutional provision providing that the president would “cease in
his [or her] functions and leave the position vacant” for “physical or mental incapacity declared by the
Congress.”228 The key point is that the “incapacity” clause could be activated by a majority of Congress,
rather than the two-thirds supermajority needed for impeachment.229 By a vote of 44 to 34, the
Congress declared Bucaram “mentally incapacitated” and removed him from power in February 1997,
only about six months after he had taken office. They initially ignored the constitutional article
governing succession and appointed the president of Congress Fabian Alarcon, rather than the vicepresident, as the new national president, before technically complying with it and having the vicepresident serve as president for two days before resigning to make way for Alarcon.230
Bucaram was a colorful and unstable figure, who led a populist party with no clear ideology.
He even embraced the seemingly derogatory nickname “the crazy one” [el loco].231 But he was not
mentally incapacitated by any reasonable definition. His dubious removal deepened the political crisis
in Ecuador and ushered in a period of extraordinary instability.232 Between 1997 and 2007, the country
had seven distinct presidents, none of whom served a full constitutional term of four years. The
incident may thus suggest concerns about the use of substitute clauses such as incapacity clauses to
evade the normal rules and voting thresholds of impeachment. It suggests that those clauses may best
be limited to a narrow set of circumstances in which their criteria are clearly met. Broader
interpretations may destabilize the constitutional order because of the deep contestability and
malleability of the category of mental incapacity. Furthermore, impeachment itself may need to be
constructed in such a way that it is usable during a significant crisis, so as to avoid political actors from
turning to either dubious alternatives such as in Ecuador, or clearly illegal steps such as the military
intervention in Honduras.
E.

The Consequences of Successful and Failed Removal Efforts

A successful impeachment process will typically lead to the immediate removal of the chief
executive. Sometimes. the president is suspended from serving after the initial vote, until the complete
resolution of the process. Failed procedures can also have formal and informal consequences,
however. For example, Tanzania also involves a feature of removal procedures that looks
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parliamentary in character.233 If at the end of the process the vote for removal fails, no new motion
can be brought for 20 months. This means the president can be somewhat insulated from repeated
use of the legislative procedures, an institutional design that resembles parliamentary systems, which
typically insulate prime ministers from votes of no confidence for a period after a failed attempt.
On the other hand, where an impeachment does go through, ouster may not be its sole effect.
In addition to removal from office, constitutional impeachment provisions also envisage lifetime (or
more limited) bans on holding public office, criminal punishment, and new elections. Consider these
in turn.
A first important constitutional choice concerns whether an impeached executive may run
again. Some constitutions ban a convicted president from ever running again for the presidency.234 In
2004, shortly after being impeached, Rolandas Paksas of Lithuania made clear his desire to run again
in the next presidential election. In anticipation, the legislature passed a constitutional amendment
prohibiting an impeached leader from competing again for office.235 Other constitutions impose
shorter prohibitions. In Brazil, for instance, the constitutional text states an eight-year ban from office
upon removal.236 This ban was imposed after Collor was removed. During the impeachment of
Rousseff, the Congress was allowed to hold two separate votes, removing her from office but
imposing no ban on future runs.237
Second, presidents are not protected from responsibility for their crimes, but as in the United
States, the process of prosecution this is often separated from that of removal from office. For
example, in the Ukraine,238 a president can be removed from office by the Senate after a hearing.
Although the Senate cannot impose criminal charges, it can refer the matter to a court for prosecution
after removal.239 Many constitutions allow for prosecution after leaving office. Collor, for example,
was tried for corruption after he was out of office but acquitted in 1994 by the Supreme Court for
lack of evidence.240
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A third most important design decisions about removal is whether or not it triggers a new
election. In the United States, of course, removal leads to the Vice President assuming the office of
the presidency for the remainder of the term. However, it is worth noting that this is neither necessary
nor particularly common. For any political system in which the president is indirectly elected, for
example by parliament, the removal of the president will typically trigger a new selection process. 241
But remarkably, it is far more common for presidential and semi-presidential systems to respond to
the removal of a president with new elections rather than to allow a substitute to serve out the
remainder of the term. In other words, the South Korean model described in Part I.A is more common
than the American one described in Part I.E. We consider the normative benefits of this design in
the next section.
Table 5: Consequences of removal in presidential and semi-presidential systems as of 2017
New elections

Vice-President or
other substitute
completes
remainder of term

Unable to determine

18

21

51

F.

Conclusion

Our large-n analysis supports three broad conclusions. First, most constitutions allow
impeachment for the commission of crimes, although many sweep beyond this to allow removal for
a range of grounds including violations of the constitution or poor performance in office. General
dissatisfaction, however, is a relatively uncommon textual ground for impeachment. In many systems,
impeachment is not just about removing criminals, but also has broader purposes such as resolving
political crises. There is also variation in the process of removal. Legislatures are the modal vehicle for
removing a president, although courts often have a (limited) additional role, especially in approving
findings of other institutions.
Second, there are some empirical regularities in the use of impeachment: (1) impeachment is
exceedingly rare; (2) the risk of misuse of “maladministration” as a ground of impeachment seems to
be quite small; (3) impeachment is almost always channeled through partisan politics; and (4)
impeachment is usually a response to systemic problems rather than, or in addition to, individual
presidential malfeasance. These patterns do not appear to have changed over time (although the
universe of cases is also small, and hence care must be taken in extrapolating beyond those cases).
They also appear unaffected by exogenous shocks such as the 2008-09 economic crisis and the
austerity regimes that followed it.
Third, the substantive predicates for removal and the choice between different procedures
likely interact. In criminal law, it is generally recognized that regulators can choose between substantive

For all constitutional systems, we count 48 in which another official serves out the remainder of the term, and 83 in
which there are new elections, with 7 that we are unable to determine.
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and procedural law as levers to make convictions either easier or harder.242A simple index capturing
their interaction is presented in Table 6. We separate out two dimensions: the substantive standard
required for removal, and procedural difficulty. The substantive standard is coded as high, medium or
low depending on whether there is no basis for removal other than illness (high), restricted to serious
constitutional violations or crimes (medium), or alternatively has looser language allowing for more
general removal (low). We code silence on the substantive standard as equaling the most difficult level
of removal. To calculate the difficulty of the procedure to remove, we draw on the idea of institutional
“veto players,” or “individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the
status quo.”243 We code an impeachment as “easy” if it requires fewer than the modal number of
decision-makers to effectuate (two), “intermediate” if it has two decision-makers with no higher than
a two-thirds vote threshold in one house, and “difficult” if it involves more than two decisionmakers.244 In addition, if two decision-makers are involved, the process is considered difficult if it
involves more than the modal legislative super-majority of two-thirds, or two-thirds majorities in more
than one house of parliament.
Table 6: Index of the Difficulty of Impeachment
Substantive
standard

Procedural
difficulty

Low

35

47

Medium

92

60

High

9

29

These two margins of impeachment difficulty are positively correlated at a level of 0.27. This means
that, in general, countries that have lower thresholds for predicate acts also tend to make the process
of removal easier, although the relationship is not perfect. Figure 3 below presents the range of
different countries in sequence on the horizontal axis in terms of the level of predicate and procedural
difficulty, with the vertical axis measuring difficulty on our index.
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Figure 3: Distribution of index of impeachment difficulty

As the figure demonstrates, most countries tend to have similar levels for the two variables. Moreover,
there is a clumping of countries in the center of our index. The United States and South Korea would
fall in the center of the figure; Brazil is in the third bar from the right. Overall, this analysis suggests
that constitutional design at the global level has converged on a moderate level of difficulty for the
removal of chief executives, with a few countries to be found at each of the extremes.
III. Theorizing Impeachment Design: Improvements and Pitfalls in the U.S. and Beyond
The analysis so far has developed an empirical account of the design and practice of
impeachment in constitutions around the globe. In this Part, we turn to normative implications of our
positive analysis. What role should impeachment of a chief executive play in a presidential system? And
given that role, what implications follow for constitutional design, either in terms of the substantive
standard for removal or in terms of its procedural channels? We focus here largely, although not
entirely, on ways in which the design and practice of impeachment in the United States might be
improved in light of comparative experience. We hence bear in mind normative values such as
democratic governance and the rule of law that should be widely accepted across the political
spectrum. Some of our suggestions here (like broadening the substantive standard for impeachment
or giving some role to the judiciary) might be carried out through changes in practice. Others would
probably or certainly require a constitutional amendment. In either case, we aim to use comparative
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evidence to contribute to the ongoing conversation about how presidential impeachment should be
operationalized in the United States, as well as globally.
A caveat here: We are mindful of the limited state of knowledge and small sample of cases.
For instance, we have largely analyzed textual provisions from constitutions in Part II, although our
discussion of Brazil and other cases in Part I revealed that statutory frameworks can also matter. A
focus on formal law also brackets a host of considerations related to the political environment and
socioeconomic considerations. Moreover, we are skeptical of the idea of a single ideal or optimal
design.245 Given variation in political, social, and economic conditions, we doubt that there is one
“right” way of doing things when it comes to constitutional design. Institutions must fit their political
and social context. At the same time, it would be bizarre to suggest that nothing could be learned from
the global history of constitutional design and practice. Perhaps the best we can offer is how to avoid
bad choices,246 and to infer likely downstream consequences from what is known of past practice. But
at the same time, there is likely a large domain of “easy cases” where the dominance of impeachment
is clear to all. In this spirit we proceed to assess the costs and benefits of the various institutional
dimensions we have laid out, beginning with the overall conceptualization of the purpose of
impeachment.
A.

Conceptualizing Impeachment: Bad Actor vs. Systemic Problem Models

One might usefully distinguish two ideal types of impeachment following the analysis above.
The first is what we call the “bad actor” model. Here impeachment is about removing serious criminals
from office; elections ought to settle everything else. This is the model, as we have indicated above,
that seems to inform most modern U.S. rhetoric on impeachment.247 A second model one might call
a “systemic problem” model. Here impeachment is not really about the individual criminality or
unfitness of the chief executive, but instead about the political context. In this model, impeachment
may provide an exit from a situation of ungovernability, such as where a president has lost a massive
amount of popularity and no longer has anything close to a governing coalition in Congress.
One of the major lessons of the case studies and empirical evidence reviewed above is that
impeachment is not, or at least not only, about the bad actor model. Thus, theories of impeachment,
such as those common in the United States, that focus exclusively on individual wrongdoing may miss
some of the core functions played by impeachment in constitutional democracies. Impeachment will
always be about systemic problems in the political environment, either in addition to, or instead of,
evidence of serious individual wrongdoing by the chief executive.
Politics typically forms a hard constraint on executive removal. As we have seen in our case
studies, even a bad actor will not be removed if she has sufficient support.248 Indeed, without a very
high level of opposition, presidents tend to survive in office whatever individually culpable act they
have committed. Typically, a successful removal involves not just attack by the opposition party or
See generally Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Knowledge, __ KNOW __ (forthcoming 2020); Aziz Z. Huq, Hippocratic
Constitutional Design, in ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 39, 40 (Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq, eds.,
2016).
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coalition, but that the president’s former party, coalition, or allies turn against him or her. This suggests
that a chief executive is most likely to be successfully ousted when he or she is perceived to be linked
to a governance situation perceived as fundamentally unacceptable across the partisan spectrum, rather
than as a function of individual foibles. In such cases, the formal basis for impeachment may appear
to be somewhat minor, but the real driving force is the loss of political support for the leader.
In Part I, we saw a number of different ways in which “fundamentally unacceptable” can be
understood: In South Korea, the president’s reliance on a “shaman” and fortune teller was perceived
to be inconsistent with minimally acceptable forms of lawful government.249 In Brazil250 and South
Africa,251 the central question was the systemic corruption of the ruling class—and the need for some
kind of “fresh start” in which law-abiding actors would putatively have a chance to mitigate corruption
and graft. No doubt the way in which systemic problems are perceived, described, and evaluated will
vary: The important point here is that absent a sufficiently shared sense of such a crisis, impeachment
is unlikely to occur in practice—even if the formal terms of constitutional text sound more in the “bad
actor” model. The U.S., it should be noted, is no exception to this trend: Efforts to impeach Clinton,
Obama, and Trump have all (so far) failed because there is an insufficient consensus on the systemic
nature of the problems associated with their presidencies.
In some cases, of course, individual wrongdoing formed a key predicate for impeachment. But
even then, there were also significant problems in the political system that made removal of the chief
executive likely. South Korea offers the best example. President Park Geun-hye was implicated in
serious criminal wrongdoing that resulted in a lengthy prison sentence. But impeachment was also
facilitated by a political context in which she had become deeply unpopular and had lost support from
members of her own party.252 South Africa, although again not technically an impeachment, is another
instance where individual wrongdoing by President Zuma underpinned a forced resignation that was
made possible because of fissures in the ruling ANC over systemic problems of state capture.253 In
these cases, the identification of the president as a bad actor is at the core of an ouster, although a
troubled political context must still exist for the removal to occur.
In contrast, in some other cases and constitutional designs, impeachment does not respond to
serious individual failings of chief executives. It is almost exclusively about the political context.
Consider Brazil and Paraguay: in the former, President Rousseff was implicated at most in failing to
suppress a corruption scandal engulfing the entire political class, and more directly in budgetary
accounting “tricks” engaged in by administrations before her.254 In the latter, the allegations against
President Lugo were aimed squarely at his performance in office, not at individual wrongdoing. Both
constitutions have broad, political standards for impeachment, and removal occurred because of
weaknesses in the chief executives that made it possible.255 In these cases, in other words, individual
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wrongdoing or the removal or “bad actors” is at most incidental to a process driven by broader
concerns.
Is the broader model of impeachment that we present, focused on systemic rather than
individual wrongdoing, a good or a bad thing from a normative perspective? This is a difficult question
to answer. But we incline to answer the question, at least tentatively, yes.
It is useful to develop the case for a “systemic problem” conception of impeachment by
situating that conception within the contrast between presidential and parliamentary systems of
government.256 Recognition of the “systemic problem” paradigm, in effect, is a way of seeing how the
two forms of governance can converge toward each other in practice, even as they remain formally
distinct. Parliamentarism, according to one fairly representative definition is “a system of government
in which the executive is chosen by, and responsible to, an elective body (the legislature), thus creating
a single locus of sovereignty at the national level.”257 The essence of parliamentarism is a logic of
mutual dependence between the legislative and executive branches: either institution has the ability to
bring down the other.258 The government can dissolve the legislature. Likewise, a legislature can bring
down the government by voting no confidence in it. In contrast, presidentialism has a logic of mutual
independence, where the president and the legislature are separately elected for fixed terms. Usnder
ordinary conditions neither has the ability to curtail the term of the other.259
Impeachment is an exception to this rule of independent and durable electoral mandates .
Correlatively, it is conceptualized as a rare and exceptional measure, one that violates the usual
structural independence of the two institutions. The opposite is supposed to be true in a parliamentary
system. Indeed, the very fact that in parliamentary systems the legislature may generally vote no
confidence in the government for any reason at all is indicative of the very different conception of
legislative/executive relations as mediated through removal protocols. The latter, of course, are quite
distinct from appointment-related arrangements. Arrangements for executive removal are a core
element of the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems. Interestingly, although
some prior work has explored various ways in which presidential systems can evolve parliamentary
features (and vice versa), this line of inquiry has not focused on removal of the chief executive, which
is seen as a canonical distinction between the two types.260
The contest between presidentialism and parliamentarism has spurred an enormous literature
with few clear conclusions. At a very minimum, the performance of each regime type clearly depends
on many other variables, including the nature of the political party system in which the regime is
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embedded.261 That said, one of the core arguments against presidentialism rests on the personalization
and centralization of power in a single individual, the president. Some work has argued that this may
pose a heightened risk of moves towards authoritarianism.262 Others have pointed out that especially
when the president and legislature are dominated by different parties or movements, presidential
systems may calcify into policy gridlock.263 Gridlock may feed perceptions that government is
ineffective, or stimulate expansions in executive power that spark moves towards authoritarianism. A
well-known example is Chile in 1973, where the administration of Salvador Allende faced a hostile
Congress, navigated around that Congress through increasingly aggressive decree powers, and amidst
rising tensions was removed in a military coup that led to a brutal dictatorship.264 In a well-functioning
parliamentary system, a government that lacked at least implicit parliamentary support would likely
fall in short order, leading either to a new government that had such support, or new legislative
elections.265
But some of the criticisms of presidential systems can be blunted by tweaking the design and
practice of impeachment to avoid or mitigate the kind of deep crisis to which presidentialism
sometimes seems to succumb. Impeachment can play instead the same sort of ‘resetting’ function that
is played by votes of no confidence, or dissolutions, in well-functioning parliamentary systems. It does
not follow that impeachment should be “easy,” or become routinized. In comparative terms,
impeachment is a relatively rare, and potentially traumatic, event in essentially all presidential
democracies. But so too are no-confidence motions in parliamentary democracies, as they tend to be
deployed with “great discretion.”266 Rather than thinking of impeachment as distinct and more
infrequent than a no-confidence motion, impeachment can be conceptualized as a similar tool for
navigating between the rigid and undesirable extremes of a strict rule of fixed-term electoral
independence for the executive and the complete reliance on legislative confidence. At least in certain
deep, systemic crises, permitting the legislature to remove the executive may ameliorate some of the
most problematic features of a presidential system of government. Exactly which such crises should
trigger use of impeachment is primarily a question for constitutional designers and practitioners in
individual countries. But the core point here is that the ‘systemic problems’ conception of
impeachment should be recognized as a useful adaption that may ameliorate one of the weaknesses
of presidentialism.
Impeachment may make “outsider” presidents who are weakly tied to the existing party system
in a country especially vulnerable to removal. These kinds of figures may be more likely to lose the
support of a coalition in Congress that is sufficient to ward off impeachment, or to have support erode
from within their own nominal party. Several of the presidents removed under threat of impeachment
For an elegant demonstration of the difficult of drawing simple comparisons, see JOSÉ ANTONIO CHEIBUB,
PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM, AND DEMOCRACY 140 (2007) (suggesting that military legacies, rather than the
choice between presidentialism and parliamentarianism, lead to democratic breakdowns).
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or similar mechanisms over the past several decades – Lugo in Paraguay, Gutierrez in Ecuador, Zelaya
in Honduras, and Collor in Brazil – constituted such figures. But notice that these kinds of actors may
be especially problematic for the health of a presidential system. Because of their weak ties to existing
parties, they may be less willing and able to get things done through ordinary political routes and may
hence turn to more problematic paths as alternatives.267 Outsiders may also be more likely to use
populist modes of governance that undermine the democratic order.268 Perhaps then, the greater
vulnerability of political outsiders to impeachment is a feature, not a bug, of the model.
Of course, moving towards a “systemic” conception of impeachment is not without costs.
One is that impeachment may exacerbate rather than defusing political crises. Consider Brazil, where
a number of commentators have argued that the removal of Rousseff drew Brazil deeper into a crisis
of political distrust and corruption.269 The removal of Rousseff further destabilized the political
system, leaving the country with a weak, corrupt, and unelected successor, and creating a vacuum in
which the hard-right populism of Jair Bolsonaro could take power in 2019. We recognize the force
of this point, although we argue (as emphasized below) that it can be partially dealt through other
procedural designs, such as requiring that impeachment trigger new elections immediately rather than
allowing automatic accession by a pre-set successor like a vice-president.
A related problem is that a broader use of impeachment could increase political polarization,
thus begetting cycles of ever more-frequent removals. Some commentators have suggested such a risk
of the “normalization of impeachment” in the United States.270 But, as shown in Part II, while
countries do seem to differ in the frequency with which they resort to impeachment, successful
removals are fairly rare everywhere. Even where a more flexible standard is employed, there do not
appear to be countries where impeachment has been successfully used with great frequency. As shown
above, impeachment can be initiated as a purely partisan exercise supported by one party or
movement, but it rarely succeeds unless it has substantial cross-partisan support, often from within
the president’s own party. In contrast, there are countries where irregular removals of presidents are
commonplace and highly destabilizing.271 Encouraging the use of impeachment as a removal tool may
in fact lessen reliance on these alternatives, whether dubious legal substitutes or extralegal maneuvers
such as military coups. But there is no reason to think that successful impeachments begat a

See Miguel Carreras, Outsiders and Executive-Legislative Conflict in Latin America, 56 LAT. AM. POL. & SOC’Y 70 (2014)
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destabilizing dynamic over the long term (and some contrary reason to think that the current global
rate of impeachment is too low).
B.

The Substantive Standard for Impeachment

Viewing impeachment as an exit from severe political crisis suggests that the standard for
impeachment should be framed in terms that are more political than legal, or at least which leave room
for ambiguity. The danger of conceptualizing impeachment in purely legal terms, say by tying it to a
finding of criminality by the president, is that this may stop political actors from being able to impeach
in some cases where there is truly a deep political crisis, but legislators struggle to identify a clear crime
committed by a president. If legislators respond by stretching the meaning of the criminal law, they
may undermine public confidence in the process. If they fail to take action because of legalistic doubts
or because of the threat of judicial intervention, they may prolong the crisis. The Honduran case
explored above perhaps best illustrates the risk.272 Substantively, a president in Honduras could only
be removed from power for committing crimes. Procedurally, the legislature played no role in removal,
which was delegated entirely to the Supreme Court. The result was a process that was too rigid to
remove an exceptionally crisis-ridden and ineffective president who had lost the support of his own
party. This is turn led to a military removal. In effect, the opposition to Zelaya struggled to identify
prosecutable crimes that he had committed, and had to make awkwardly framed arguments to square
their purpose with the available legal tools.
The U.S. standard for impeachment, “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors,” is notoriously ambiguous, as we have noted, and debate continues to rage about
whether the term should be limited to certain classes of prosecutable crimes, or should take on a
broader meaning.273 As practiced in the modern period, however, it is relatively narrowly focused on
crimes.274 So read, the U.S. standard is subject to the same critique as the Honduran model. As one of
us has argued in another context, there is a risk that the policy disagreements that are endemic to a
polity will be treated as points of legal infidelity. Rather than domesticating the polity’s endogenous
conflict, the law’s decision to treat policy disagreements as a justification for punishment might
escalate the stakes of political disagreement.275 As the Johnson impeachment and the Clinton
impeachment respectively illustrate, it inexorably impels president’s political opponents to reframe
legal disagreements as matters of deep infidelity or to manufacture criminal offenses about the sexual
veniality and vanity of the modal middle-aged politico. To paraphrase Raymond Carver, politics—and
the deep politics of perceived structural crisis—is what we are really talking about when we talk about
impeachment.276
In contrast to the Honduran and U.S. cases, the Brazilian and Paraguayan constitutions (as
well as many other constitutions around the world) supply the relevant institutional actors with a
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broader and more flexible concept of impeachable offenses. The Paraguayan text, which explicitly
allows impeachment for “bad performance” in office as well as common or high crimes, is perhaps
the best example.277 The Brazilian formulation, which differentiates common crimes from vaguer and
more highly political “acts against the constitution,” gets at similar ideas.278 The advantage of these
formulations is that they may make it easier for impeachment to serve as a reset during a deep political
crisis, even if evidence of individual criminality is scarce.
A relatively broad reading of “high crimes and misdemeanors” is of course plausible. In fact,
it finds substantial support from both original understanding and scholarship. Such a reading would
more easily sweep beyond criminal acts to include presidents who engaged in conduct that created
systemic risks.279 Readings of the clause that focus on concepts such as grave “abuses against the
state”280 or the “abuse or violation of some public trust”281 would do the job tolerably well. Whether
a broad reading would be available given present partisan dynamics, though, is another question.
A similar analysis illuminates the appropriate voting threshold for impeachment. It is, to be
sure, difficult to generalize about this issue. The consequences of any given voting threshold are very
sensitive to context. But if a key function of impeachment is to serve as an extreme form of a noconfidence vote in situations of crisis, then allowing removal by a demanding (but not impossible)
supermajority makes sense. In particular, actors probably should become vulnerable to impeachment
when they lose high levels of support from their own parties and coalitions, something that
comparative experience bears out. Not all presidents who lose such support are impeached, of course,
but that is the kind of context in which impeachment becomes a realistic option. All this is to say that
we think that most constitutions have answered the design question properly by using demanding (but
not insurmountable) supermajority rules.282
C.

One Standard or Many?

Our argument also has implications for the uniformity of impeachment standards across
different types of elected officials. Consider the U.S. case. As normally glossed,283 the U.S. constitution
establishes the same standard for impeachment for several different types of actors – the president
and vice president, lesser executive officials like cabinet secretaries, and federal judges.284 Some other
constitutions around the world adopt the same uniform approach. But others, like that of Brazil, adopt
different substantive standards (and different procedures or institutions) for the impeachment of
different kinds of actors.285
The differentiated approach adopted by Brazil seems to us the superior one, and the uniform
U.S. approach deeply problematic. A single impeachment standard bundles together several different
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types of actors who have different constitutional functions, distinct democratic mandates, are subject
to different alternative forms of accountability, and whose removal will precipitate radically divergent
repercussions. The president is the sole head of a branch of government and generally remains in place
at least until the next fixed election is held. Cabinet secretaries and similar officials often have much
more fluidity, since they can often be removed at will by the president. Judges, of course, also serve
fixed terms (for life in the United States), but generally have no electoral accountability and serve in
positions where political independence is often deemed essential. Lumping all these different actors
together makes little sense. The standard for impeachment should be tailored to the function played
by each actor, and not automatically set the same for all officials.286
For example, we have argued that removal of presidents will sometimes be desirable to allow
a reset during a deep political crisis. This suggests a relatively broad, ambiguous standard for removal
of presidents, perhaps incorporating poor performance in office, abuse of power, or similar notions.
In contrast, allowing removal of judges on similarly broad grounds may give the political branches too
much power to retaliate against the judiciary. For this reason, it may make sense to tether judicial
removal to a narrower set of grounds tied to serious criminality. Furthermore, in the United States,
judges are subject to other sanctions for wrongdoing, including judicial discipline and criminal
prosecution. Cabinet officers too can be criminally prosecuted. At least under current understandings
put forth by the Office of Legal Counsel, the President is not subject to criminal prosecution while in
office, which in our view weighs toward a lower threshold for impeachment, as it is the only available
mechanism for accountability in between elections.
D.

The Process of Impeachment

It is even harder to generalize about the process of impeachment, for which our case studies
and empirical evidence show great variation. However, one core point that we draw from the evidence
is that process should follow from the purpose of impeachment. The set of considerations that may
be dominant where the core purpose of a removal is cleansing a “bad actor” may be different from
the core purpose where the impeachment responds to a systemic failure. Relatedly, different
institutions may usefully play different roles during an impeachment.
Contrary to the U.S. process for impeachment, our analysis in Part II demonstrated that many
constitutions involve actors other than the legislature in presidential removal. Some go so far as to
adopt different kinds of impeachment procedures for different offenses. In some countries, for
example, allegations of criminal wrongdoing involve the courts, while those alleging poor performance
in office or similar political allegations involve only the legislature.287 This represents a rough sorting
of cases in which the bad actor model is dominant, and those in which the removal is mainly about
systemic effects.
It seems to us very difficult to take a firm normative position on this issue of differentiated
standards, which may provide some benefits but also may create new problems, such as determining
how an allegation should be routed between processes. Still, comparative exploration of process helps
to show how impeachment may help to build or undermine the credibility of allegations, and thus
Sunstein argues that although the constitutional standard for impeachment for judges and presidents “is the same,”
judicial impeachment should have a “mildly different and somewhat lower bar” because of pragmatic factors, especially
the “uniquely destabilizing” consequences of presidential removal. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 115-16. This argument
may be reconcilable with ours: the predicate grounds of judicial impeachment should be narrower than presidential
impeachment, but deliberations on whether a president eligible for impeachment should be removed ought to take
greater account of pragmatic considerations.
287 See, e.g., CONST. BRAZ., art. 86 (1988); CONST. COL., art. 175 (1991).
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how process and substance interact. The South Korean and South African removals were greatly aided
by the presence of independent institutions that would investigate facts and weigh the credibility of
allegations – the Constitutional Court and Public Protector, respectively.288 In South Africa, the
Constitutional Court helped to lend additional credibility to the Public Protector by ruling that its
report was legally binding on the political branches.289 At any rate, the independence and reputation
of both institutions seemingly helped to enhance the credibility of the removals.
A comparison to the contemporary U.S. context is instructive. Here impeachment
investigations are often left to Congress itself. This may undermine confidence in the investigation’s
findings. Two recent discussions of impeachment, of course, were impacted by independent
investigations, the Starr investigation into President Clinton and the Mueller investigation into
President Trump. Special counsel Mueller was not well-insulated from the president, raising concerns
about potential interference or firing, and was not free to make recommendations free of constraining
Justice Department legal positions.290 Similar concerns materialized during the investigations of
President Nixon.291 Thus, one problem is that U.S. constitutional design has a dearth of
constitutionally insulated institutions analogous to the Public Protector in South Africa. Of course,
even seemingly independent investigations that have been involved in recent impeachments have not
been trusted and instead have been portrayed as politicized. The Mueller investigation, for example,
has been widely derided by the right (not least by the president himself) as a partisan “witch hunt.”292
The Starr investigation, which was carried out by a statutorily independent Special Counsel,293 received
a similar reception on the left.294
The broad point is that U.S. constitutional design and scholarship could benefit from thinking
of the ways in which other institutions might play a useful role in carrying out specialized functions
(such as fact-finding) or in enhancing the credibility of removals, especially in cases where they are
tied to the finding of criminal wrongdoing (or something similar) by a sitting president. Similarly, it
may be worth thinking of ways in which institutions might be used to spur the political branches to
take their responsibilities seriously when confronted with the fruits of independent investigations, as
the Constitutional Court did in South Africa.
E.

The Role of Courts and Due Process
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The role of courts is an especially interesting issue in impeachment processes. As we surveyed
above, the U.S. constitutional text is silent on the role of the courts during impeachment, with the
exception of noting that the Chief Justice presides over Senate trial of the president of the United
States, a role that was understood by Rehnquist during the impeachment of Clinton to be
ceremonial.295 U.S. courts have nonetheless stayed out of impeachment processes.296 The U.S. is not
alone in taking such a position; the Paraguayan Supreme Court, for example, took a similar stance
after the impeachment of Lugo.297 But the comparative evidence shows that the posture of no judicial
involvement is one end of a broad spectrum. In some cases, such as South Korea, courts play a formal
role in the impeachment process, often as the final step in the process after an initial political
determination has been made.298 In other cases, like Brazil, courts may accept some role of judicial
review, for example to determine whether the procedure for impeachment has been followed or the
substantive standard has been met.299 In the rare extreme, as in Honduras prior to 2013, courts may
be imbued with the sole power of removal.300
The comparative evidence is too thin to establish exactly how to fix the best point on this
spectrum for any given polity. This likely depends on context. As we have noted, the Honduran
solution of placing removal power exclusively in the hands of the courts seems deeply problematic,
because it ignores the essentially political nature of removal. It required that the president be charged
with a crime before impeachment proceedings could even begin. It may even have allowed Zelaya to
cling to power for a long time after he had lost the support of virtually the entire political elite,
including his own party. The legislature lacked any way to initiate removal proceedings against him,
even though they complained repeatedly about his conduct.
Aside from this extreme position, though, a range of forms of judicial involvement may work
at least tolerably well. In the South Korean case, the role of the Supreme Court in confirming the
removal of the president may have helped to build confidence in the outcome by showing that the
removal was not merely the continuance of ordinary politics by other means. There is an obvious
danger in a court playing this kind of confirmation role: It may stymie removals that are politically
necessary but harder to justify legally. The countervailing benefit of models like the South Korean one
is that direct judicial involvement of this type may bolster the credibility of impeachment processes
and make it harder to argue that they are just a politically motivated, “constitutional coup,” as in Brazil
and Paraguay.
The Brazilian Supreme Court was heavily criticized for its various interventions into the
Rousseff impeachment.301 But the Court’s interventions, as well as those of the South African high
court, may still illuminate the ways in which a judiciary could potentially shape impeachment without
outstepping their reach. The Brazilian Court did not adjudicate any direct attacks on the impeachment
295

See supra Part I.E.

Scholarly treatments of the U.S. generally also find this non-involvement to be a good thing. See, e.g., BLACK, supra
note 8, at 55.
296

297

See supra note 100.

298

See supra Part I.A.

299

See supra Part I.B.

300

See supra text accompanying notes 202-210.

See, e.g., Aaron Ansell, Impeaching Dilma Rousseff: the double life of corruption allegations on Brazil’s political right, 59 CUL.
THEORY & CRITIQUE 312, 318 (2018).
301

54

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3461120

process. Rather, it issued several rulings that shaped its procedures. The President of the Court as
presiding official of the impeachment trial in the Senate also issued rulings that shaped the process.
More powerfully, the South African Constitutional Court’s interventions had the effect of keeping the
channels of political redress for corruption open, and ensuring that Zuma could not bury charges
against him.302 It provides a salutary model of a high court effectively and deftly defending
constitutional democracy under the rule of law, even though the Court there made no substantive
decisions on the merits of removal of President Zuma.
In short, there are forms of judicial involvement in impeachment that do not immediately risk
the “over-legalization” trap that makes would make impeachment unduly rigid. In this sense, the strict
U.S. position of permitting virtually no impeachment controversy to be justiciable may be unnecessary,
and perhaps even undesirable.
Relatedly, our analysis also has implications for due process arguments of the kind lodged
during the removal of President Lugo of Paraguay.303 From the perspective of the individual official,
these seem reasonable claims because the transparency of a process, and its perceived fairness, seem
potentially important to popular acceptance and legitimacy of the result. But at the same time,
invocations of due process, or similar concepts, during impeachment procedures should be used with
great care. It is not just, as the U.S. Supreme Court suggests in the Nixon decision,304 that an
impeachment trial in the Senate is by necessity quite different from a standard criminal trial. It is also
that it may serve a purpose of political reset that goes well beyond the character of the individual
president, and instead goes more to the political context within which that president is working. In
such structural debates, individual claims to “due” process ought to have less weight.
F.

Impeachment and the ‘Hard Reboot’ of a Democratic System

In many systems, impeachment works as a “hard reboot” of the democratic process by
triggering new elections upon removal. The South Korean system provides an example: It requires a
new election within 60 days of removal, resetting the schedule of presidencies.305 Indeed, we found
above in Table 6 that in most systems, impeachment triggers a new election. This design avoids one
of the key problems with the U.S., Paraguayan, and Brazilian systems (among many others): namely
that removal of a president means he or she will be replaced by his own vice-president, usually of the
same party and political persuasion, who then completes the full term. Restarting with a new election
is closer to the design of a parliamentary system, and allows the system to avoid gridlock, which as
noted above is one of the risks of a presidential system.306 Allowing the constitutional order to hit the
“reset button” in this fashion seems to us like a useful tool.
In contrast, allowing the vice president to ascend to power once the president is removed, as
in the United States, seems a problematic design. Allowing a pre-selected official of the same political
coalition to ascend to power for the remainder of the ousted president’s term invites abuse of
impeachment by allies of the presumptive heir to the throne, and it may at any rate prolong the crisis
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by preventing a true political reset. The vice-presidential succession model raises an obvious possibility
of manipulation, where vice presidents or their allies seek to engineer the removal of presidents
knowing that they will then ascend to power. This is not just a theoretical risk, but rather a likely
description of dynamics in Brazil and Paraguay. In both countries, the successor (Michel Temer and
Federico Franco) were affiliated with a different party than the president. In both, there were credible
rumors that the vice-presidents were plotting to remove presidents long before the impeachment.307
The description of events across both countries as a “constitutional coup,” despite the fact that formal
impeachment procedures were followed, depended in large part on the fact that the movements appear
to have been engineered by supporters of the two vice-presidents as a way to gain political advantage,
and as “reactionary movements” by conservative forces against progressive presidents.308
Further, allowing the vice-president to ascend to power for the remainder of an ousted
president’s term does not allow for a political reset. If the vice-president is still somewhat close
politically to the deposed president, impeachment may well do little to resolve the political crisis.
Imagine, for example, if Al Gore had succeeded to Bill Clinton in 1999, or if Mike Pence were to
succeed Donald Trump. In both cases, the new leaders would likely have continued many of the same
political dynamics as the old. Even in cases where the vice president is distant from the old president
politically (as in both Paraguay and Brazil), the successor is fairly likely to be embroiled in similar
scandals as the old president. Temer, for example, was embroiled in a series of corruption scandals
during his two-and-a-half year interim presidency. Indeed, months following the end of his term in
December 2018, he was arrested for alleged involvement in a corruption enterprise. 309 In Paraguay,
Franco similarly was embroiled in corruption-related controversies during and after his roughly oneyear term in office.310 Furthermore, neither Temer nor Franco was popular: Neither could have won
an election.
What should happen instead? We think the case studies of Part I suggest the superiority of the
South Korean design, which allows impeachment to play a hard reset function in cases of political
crisis. Holding a new election shortly after an impeachment reduces the possibility of strategic
initiation of a removal process. The relevant players will have more uncertainty about who will benefit
from the impeachment. In particular, supporters of impeachment will need to worry that backers of
the deposed president may win the subsequent election, especially if there is a perception that
impeachment was undertaken abusively or for a narrow agenda. A new election is also more likely to
create an exit from a political crisis, since a new president will be able to claim a renewed popular
mandate.311
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In this way, impeachment followed by new elections helps to ease the much-criticized rigidity
of presidentialism by giving it a bit of the flavor of parliamentarism. In parliamentary systems,
governmental crises and drastic losses of governmental support by the legislature are often, albeit not
inevitably, resolved not just through a change in the executive cabinet, but through new popular
elections. Even if new elections do not occur after a change in government, the new government is
reliant on at least implicit legislative support. In contrast, the fixed electoral calendar of presidentialism
generally prevents the holding of new elections as an escape valve, even during a deep crisis. Indeed,
this fixed calendar is often seen as one of the biggest vulnerabilities of presidentialism, sometimes
feeding deadlock and even leading to breakdown. The removal of a chief executive through an
extraordinary process like impeachment seems to us to be a strong candidate for an exception to the
general rule of a fixed calendar: it allows a new election to help provide an exit from a crisis, but at the
same time, impeachment is too rare an event to lead to very frequent elections that might themselves
destabilize the system.
Our argument for a new election rather than vice-presidential succession following a
successful impeachment, to be sure, leaves many important questions of constitutional design open.
One is who should serve as interim president for the period of time before the new election is held.
Elevating a relatively weak figure as in South Korea (or even an outsider such as a judge) may make
sense in such a context; designers may also want to consider whether this caretaker should be eligible
to run in the special election, given particularly its emphasis on resetting the political system. Another
key question is how quickly a new election should be held. Again, the Korean solution of 60 days
seems like a fairly reasonable solution. It gives political groups some time to organize, while ensuring
that a reset happens quickly and limiting time for the new incumbent and his or her allies to consolidate
their position.312
A third question, perhaps the most interesting, is whether a successful impeachment should
trigger new elections just for the president, or for the legislature as well. Having an impeachment
trigger legislative elections in addition to presidential ones may risk deterring even meritorious
impeachments. And perhaps it seems illogical to “punish” the legislature for removing a corrupt,
criminal, or incompetent chief executive. However, having impeachment trigger mutual dissolution
may help to facilitate exit from a crisis by allowing voters to weigh in on the composition of both
institutions that were involved. There are at least a few examples of presidential constitutions allowing
the kind of mutual dissolution that is usually a hallmark of parliamentarism,313 and impeachment may
again be a strong case for this kind of design. Moreover, triggering mutual elections may help to avoid
abuse of impeachment by making legislators think long and hard about the consequences of
presidential removal.314 Finally, it would avoid unintended consequences in terms of the political
rhythm of the constitutional order, in that it would not lead to asymmetric terms as between
presidencies and legislatures.
combination of these provisions provides only a narrow window of one year (the fourth year of a presidential term) in
which recall can be planned and carried out in a way that triggers a reset.
A related question is whether there should be a de minimus exception to the rule requiring new elections in cases where
the old president had very little time left in their term. If such an exception exists, we would suggest, it should likely be
fairly short (say, no more than six months or a year) in order to allow impeachment to play the reset function that we lay
out here.
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See, e.g., CONST. ECUADOR, art. 148 (2008).

Alternatively, one could include a rule that failed attempts at impeachment mean that no new motion can be brought
for a set period, as described above for Tanzania. See CONST. TANZANIA, art. 46(A)(2) (1977).
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Conclusion
Based on a broad range of comparative evidence, we have argued that presidential
impeachment in practice is about far more than removing criminals or other bad actors; it often serves
as an exit from the deep structural crises that presidential (and semi-presidential) systems of
government sometimes undergo. We have also argued that such a conceptualization of impeachment
is not only descriptively accurate in comparative terms, but also normatively desirable.
Our analysis has important normative implications for the debate and design of impeachment
in the United States by clarifying the function of impeachment. Some of our findings shed new light
on old problems, for example when we argue for a broader and more political understanding of “high
crimes and misdemeanors.” Others highlight overlooked problems in U.S. impeachment, which could
be fixed through reinterpretations or constitutional amendment: that judicial abdication of any role
during impeachment might be neither necessary nor desirable; that impeachment standards arguably
should not be uniform across types of political actors; and that successful impeachments should trigger
new elections, rather than simply allowing the vice-president to succeed to the presidency for the
remainder of an ousted chief executive’s term.
Following our normative recommendations could make impeachments more frequent, both
in the United States and elsewhere around the world. Would this be desirable? As noted above,315
Brazil is one of the few countries in the world to have made fairly frequent use of impeachment in
modern times, removing Collor through this route in 1992 and then Rousseff in 2016. While there are
certainly many problems in modern Brazilian democracy, impeachment as an occasional tool to
remove weak and ineffective presidents unable to forge a governing coalition in a fragmented
Congress may sometimes ameliorate crisis, rather than exacerbating it. This would be truer, of course,
if the design of the impeachment mechanism allowed for new elections and thus a full reset following
impeachment, rather than automatic succession of the vice president.
We have also shown that there is no evidence to date that impeachment or attempted
impeachment generates immediate destabilizing consequences, or is correlated in practices with
reductions in democratic quality. Increasing the availability of impeachments for systemic problems
(although not for bad actors) thus holds the prospect of mitigating some of the worst aspects of
presidential democracy without generating new costs. It is a constitutional possibility, in short, that
seems well worth exploring.
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See supra Part I.B.
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